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ENDING CLASS ACTIONS AS WE KNOW THEM:
RETHINKING THE AMERICAN CLASS ACTION
Linda S. Mullenix∗
ABSTRACT
Class actions have been a feature of the American litigation landscape for
over seventy-five years. For most of this period, American-style class litigation
was either unknown or resisted around the world. Notwithstanding this chilly
reception abroad, American class litigation has always been a central feature
of American procedural exceptionalism, nurtured on an idealized historical
narrative of the class action device. Although this romantic narrative endures,
the experience of the past twenty-five years illuminates a very different
chronicle about class litigation. Thus, in the twenty-first century American
class action litigation has evolved in ways that are significantly removed from
its golden age. The transformation of class action litigation raises legitimate
questions concerning the fairness and utility of this procedural mechanism,
and whether class litigation actually accomplishes its stated goals and
rationales. With the embrace of aggregative nonclass settlements as a
primary—if not preferred—modality for large-scale dispute resolution, the
time has come to question whether the American class action in its twenty-first
century incarnation has become a disutilitarian artifact of an earlier time. This
Article explores the evolving dysfunction of the American class action and
proposes a return to a more limited, cabined role for class litigation. In so
doing, the Article eschews alternative nonclass aggregate settlement
mechanisms that have come to dominate the litigation landscape. The Article
ultimately asks readers to envision a world without the twenty-first century
American damage class action, limiting class procedure to injunctive
remedies. In lieu of the damage class action, the Article encourages more
robust public regulatory enforcement for alleged violation of the laws.
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INTRODUCTION
Americans seemingly love their class actions. The American class action
has been a fixture in the federal procedural toolbox for over seventy-five years
and has become a central feature of American procedural exceptionalism.1 This
narrative of American procedural exceptionalism posits that the American
justice system is not only the best in the world but that American procedural
rules and its jury system are superior to comparative civil and common law
systems abroad.2 And until fairly recently, the class action device was a
uniquely American innovation, resisted (if not rejected) by most foreign legal
systems.3
The modern American class action rule emerged during a period of
celebrated liberal legislative initiatives intended to expand the civil rights and
liberties of ordinary American citizens. President Lyndon Johnson’s historic
first 100 days during 1964 spearheaded his Great Society legislative program.4
These legislative initiatives created new substantive rights that would have
been rendered nugatory without some procedural mechanism to enforce those
newly-created rights. Thus, in the early 1960s the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules embarked on a contemporaneous initiative to liberalize the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.5 The amendment of the class action rule in 1966
represented a unique convergence with the creation of new substantive rights
supported through a rulemaking that provided a procedural mechanism for the
enforcement of those new substantive rights.6
1 See, e.g., Richard Marcus, ‘American Exceptionalism’ in Goals for Civil Litigation, in GOALS OF CIVIL
JUSTICE AND CIVIL PROCEDURE IN CONTEMPORARY JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 123 (Alan Uzelac ed., 2014) (praising
American procedural exceptionalism as a uniquely American role for civil litigation, illustrated by relaxed
pleading, broad discovery, and jury trial); Linda S. Mullenix, American Exceptionalism and the Theory of
Convergence: Are We There Yet?, in COMMON LAW, CIVIL LAW AND THE FUTURE OF CATEGORIES 41 (Janet
Walker & Oscar G. Chase eds., 2010).
2 See supra note 1.
3 See, e.g., Richard B. Cappalli & Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for Continental Europe? A
Preliminary Inquiry, 6 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 217, 218–19 (1992) (documenting European resistance to
and rejection of American style class action litigation, referring to it as a kind of Rube-Goldberg procedural
contraption).
4 See ROBERT DALLEK, LYNDON B. JOHNSON: PORTRAIT OF A PRESIDENT 190–207 (2004).
5 See David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang, 1953–1980, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 600–01 (2013) (describing the failure of the original class action rule). See generally
Sherman L. Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204 (1966) (commentary on the
1966 federal rules revision package); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (pt. 1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1967) (notes from the
Advisory Committee Reporter on the 1966 rules amendments).
6 See supra note 5.
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Modern American class action practice, then, emerged as a consequence of
the 1966 amendment to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
liberalized modern American class action rule has long been imbued with an
idealized historical narrative in support of its merits. This narrative chronicles
the deployment of the class action device in the late 1960s and early 1970s to
accomplish landmark social justice reforms. During this so-called golden age
of class litigation, public interest lawyers used the class action mechanism to
integrate school systems, deinstitutionalize mental health facilities, reform
conditions of confinement for inmates in prison systems, challenge
discriminatory housing and public accommodation laws, and address various
types of employment discrimination.7
This golden age of class litigation lasted for approximately a decade after
the 1966 class action amendments went into effect.8 Not surprisingly, the
initial enthusiasm for class litigation eventually engendered a backlash, with
the Supreme Court issuing several restrictive decisions during the 1970s that
constrained the ability of class counsel to vigorously pursue class litigation.9
By the end of the 1970s, institutional reform litigation faded somewhat from
the litigation landscape, replaced by mass tort cases.10 In this period mass tort
7 See, e.g., Soc’y for the Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (ordering corrective measures at state institution for mentally handicapped children in violation of
constitutional rights), vacated, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984); Manicone v. Cleary, No. 74 C 575, slip op.
(E.D.N.Y. June 30, 1975) (granting subject to certain limitations, inter alia, prisoner access to telephones);
United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687 (E.D.N.Y.) (right of defendants to obtain food meeting dietary
requirements), modified, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975); Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y.
1974) (ordering an integration plan for the Mark Twain middle school in Coney Island, Brooklyn), aff’d, 512
F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975); Wilson v. Beame, 380 F. Supp. 1232 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (tolerance for Muslim
prisoners). See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1976) (discussing the new public law litigation paradigm).
8 See Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 647,
648 (1988) (“Perhaps more basically, Chayes’s focus on public law litigation seems ill-conceived because the
incidence of the kind of lawsuits he had in mind—school desegregation and prison conditions cases—was
waning even as he wrote.”).
9 See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177–79 (1974) (allocating costs of sending
notice to class members on plaintiffs); Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (requiring that all
class members in diversity class actions individually satisfy the jurisdictional amount in controversy
requirement), superseded by statute, Federal Courts Study Implementation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650,
tit. III, § 310, 104 Stat. 5104, 5113–14 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012)), as recognized in Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 562 (2005).
10 See PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1986). See
generally LINDA S. MULLENIX, MASS TORT LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2008) (law textbook
providing extensive overview of mass tort cases and the challenges these cases pose); JACK B. WEINSTEIN,
INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION (1995) (providing overview of mass tort litigation and
assessing its effectiveness).
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litigation emerged as the new paradigmatic complex litigation, and mass tort
cases dominated class action litigation throughout the ensuing two decades
until the end of the 1990s.11
Spanning five decades, class action litigation has always been subject to a
pendulum effect, with periods of expansion typically followed by periods of
retrenchment. Thus, by the end of the twentieth century, federal appellate
courts and the Supreme Court effectively put the brakes on innovative class
action experiments, effectively ending the era of federal mass tort class
litigation.12 As a consequence of judicial refinement of the threshold rigorous
analysis standard and exacting application of Rule 23 requirements, federal
class litigation has become more challenging to pursue.13 Reflecting on the
Court’s series of increasingly restrictive decisions, commentators declared that
class action litigation effectively is dead.14 Nothing, however, could be further
from the truth.15 Instead, in the late 1990s the plaintiffs’ class action bar
regrouped and retreated to state courts, which experienced an onslaught of
class litigation until Congress enacted the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.16
Three features characterize complex litigation in the twenty-first century.
First, contrary to naysayers and skeptics, federal class litigation remains
vibrant and thriving.17 Second, attorneys have shifted their efforts from class
actions to other means to achieve collective redress, most commonly to
11

See generally RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT (2007) (providing
an analysis of the role of lawyers in mass tort litigation and discussing cases through the 1990s).
12 See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
519 (1997); Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84
F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
13 See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust
Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); In re Hydrogen
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008).
14 See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming Near-Total Demise of the Modern
Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U.
L. REV. 729 (2013); George Rutherglen, Wal-Mart, AT&T Mobility, and the Decline of the Deterrent Class
Action, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 24 (2012); Benjamin Sachs-Michaels, Note, The Demise of Class Actions Will
Not Be Televised, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 665 (2011).
15 See Andrew J. Trask, Reactions to Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Litigation Strategy and Legal Change, 62
DEPAUL L. REV. 791, 793 (2013) (asserting that “despite the many academics and lawyers who have written
otherwise [the Court’s decisions] do not represent the ‘demise’ of the class action,” but rather a trend over time
of adjusting litigation standards).
16 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715, 2074 (2012)). The
law noted that it would not affect the Court’s rulemaking authority. § 8, 119 Stat. at 14.
17 See Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107
NW. U. L. REV. 511, 531–36 (2013); see also Class Action, LAW360, http://www.law360.com/classaction/ (last
visited Dec. 14, 2014) (daily blog report of class action decisions and developments in class action cases).
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nonclass contractual settlements.18 In addition, attorneys involved in complex,
large-scale litigation have shifted the procedural rhetoric from “class” litigation
to “aggregate” litigation.19 And third, multidistrict litigation procedures have
assumed new prominence in the litigation landscape.20
In this changed landscape—with the shift to nonclass dispute resolution
auspices—the continued fate of the class action rule in its current form takes
on added significance. However, if it is true that nonclass modalities to
accomplish collective redress will prevail, then debates over the class action
rule might seem as useless as exercises in moving deck chairs on the Titanic.
This Article contends that, notwithstanding the advent of nonclass
aggregate litigation, Rule 23 class litigation remains a vital feature of the
litigation landscape. However, class litigation in the twenty-first century has
moved a very long way from the golden age of class litigation during the
1960s. Instead, class litigation now is dominated by Rule 23(b)(3) damage
class actions, rather than the injunctive classes of the Civil Rights Era. This
tectonic shift to damage class actions, in turn, has exposed troubling fault lines
in the pursuit and implementation of class action relief. This Article suggests
that class actions are not dead but that they are just badly done, indicating a
compelling need for rethinking of the class action rule.
The evolution of class litigation in the United States might very well be
analogized to the saga of common law pleading in England. As is well known,
by the mid-eighteenth century, common law pleading in England had become
so complex and arcane that it entailed endless traps for the unwary pleader.21
These impenetrable difficulties ultimately led to the great eighteenth-century

18 See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L.
REV. 265 (2011) (discussing problems with nonclass aggregate settlements); Thomas E. Willging & Emery G.
Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U.
KAN. L. REV. 775 (2010) (discussing the trend towards nonclass aggregate settlements).
19 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02(a) (2010) (“An aggregate
lawsuit is a single lawsuit that encompasses claims or defenses held by multiple parties or represented
persons.”).
20 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012); see also Willging & Lee, supra note 18, at 776.
21 See Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modern World of Civil
Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1107,
1111–12 (2010).
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reforms of common law pleading in England,22 followed by the Field Code
reforms in the United States.23
The original 1938 American class action rule was similarly opaque and
difficult to apply, which led to the 1966 amendment of the rule.24 In the
ensuing fifty years, the development of Rule 23 class action jurisprudence has
paralleled the saga of common law pleading before the eighteenth-century
reforms. Thus, the principles and standards governing Rule 23 have become
increasingly opaque, arcane, and difficult to apply, subject to considerable
judicial discretion and inconsistency. Doctrinal nuances abound, and appellate
court disagreements pervade the class action arena. Indeed, it is not too
far-fetched to suggest that current class action jurisprudence similarly creates
traps for unwary pleaders and defenders, who frequently are able to find
judicial support for any arguable position on either side of the class action
docket.25 Moreover, similar to litigants subjected to eighteenth-century
common law pleading, parties involved in class action litigation typically find
their cases dragging on for years without reaching judicial consideration of the
merits of the litigation.
This Article argues that Rule 23 is broken, dysfunctional, and in need of a
wholesale root-and-branch reform. It suggests that the post-1966 class action
rule, particularly the domination of the Rule 23(b)(3) damage class action, no
longer serves the purported rationales justifying the rule. Furthermore, the
negative consequences of certain types of class litigation offset any perceived
benefits. This Article advocates a return to a simpler class action rule limited to
injunctive relief cases, with abandonment of the Rule 23(b)(3) damage class
action. There was no damage class action prior to the 1966 amendments. The
eighteenth-century reforms of common law pleading—including the basic
precepts of the Field Code—provide an illuminating approach and useful
model for drafting a rule that simplifies class action procedure.
Finally, in advocating for a reformed, simplified class action rule, this
Article is not intended to endorse nonclass aggregate settlement modalities as a
substitute for class litigation. Moreover, it is not intended to slight the very real
concerns implicated in small-claims consumer harms. It is an argument,
22

Id. at 1109 (“[N]otice pleading developed in the 1930s as a reaction to arcane common law pleading
rules and rigid code pleading.”).
23 See Doug Rendleman, Simplification—A Civil Procedure Perspective, 105 DICK. L. REV. 241, 243
(2001) (federal notice pleading meant to replace cumbersome code pleading).
24 See Cohn, supra note 5; Kaplan, supra note 5, at 380–86; Marcus, supra note 5, at 600–01.
25 See Schwartz & Appel, supra note 21, at 1111–12.
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instead, for increased, robust public regulatory enforcement of laws and
enhanced recourse to ombudsmen or similar auspices to resolve such
small-claims aggregate harms.
I. COMPETING CLASS ACTION NARRATIVES
A. The Romantic Narrative of Class Action Litigation
A romantic narrative permeates the debate over the desirability and efficacy
of class action litigation. Plaintiffs’ class counsel and legal scholars
consistently recite this romantic narrative,26 which is often endorsed in any
number of judicial decisions.27 As will be seen, while class action advocates
repeatedly recount the romantic narrative, business associations that are the
frequent objects of class litigation have their own darker counternarrative.
There are several core elements that characterize the romantic narrative of
the class action. First, class litigation always features helpless and hopeless
plaintiffs in dire need of assistance who are incapable of fending for
themselves and exercising independent autonomy: the downtrodden, the

26 E.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Enforcing the Social Compact Through Representative Litigation, 33
CONN. L. REV. 1239, 1242 (2001) (discussing regulation by class litigation as a means for correcting the
transgressions of corporate conduct harming public health, safety, and consumer rights; redressing corporate
behavior that “transgresses the social compact;” and restoring “the balance of liberties, rights, and obligations
in a community of equals”); Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Thomas M. Sobel, Practitioners’ Note, Equity for the
Victims, Equity for the Transgressor: The Classwide Treatment of Punitive Damages Claims, 74 TUL. L. REV.
2005 (2000) (discussing classwide punitive damages as effective means for punishing transgressive corporate
behavior); Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Essentials of Democratic Mass Litigation, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 499, 501–03 (2012) (examining how class actions afford consistent and efficient means for addressing
mass harms, and promote and protect democratic principles in consumer rights, public health and safety, and
human rights violations); Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Procedural Vision of Arthur R. Miller: A Practitioner’s
Tribute, 90 OR. L. REV. 929, 931 (2012) (describing the function of class litigation as providing access to
justice for investors, consumers, and tort victims).
27 See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“[T]he Advisory Committee had
dominantly in mind vindication of ‘the rights of groups of people who individually would be without effective
strength to bring their opponents into court at all.’” (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969))); Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554, 567 (6th Cir. 2007)
(“[T]he policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries
do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.” (quoting
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d
32, 41–42 (1st Cir. 2003) (discussing policy goals of class action litigation, with focus on consumer small
claims actions); Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 427 (5th Cir. 1998) (Dennis, J., dissenting)
(summarizing the aims of class actions: to promote judicial efficiency and economy, obviate the need for
multiple proceedings, aggregate small claims, and enhance access to justice).
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exploited, the uneducated, the illiterate, the disarmed little-guy.28 Correlatively,
the narrative needs a villain, and corporations or other business entities fulfill
this role.29 In the romantic narrative, corporations are powerful, evil,
malevolent, bad-actors intent on profit-making at the expense of the health,
safety, and well-being of individuals.30 In extreme versions of the romantic
narrative, these defendants callously, indifferently, and cynically plot to harm
their own consumers.31
A second feature of the romantic narrative focuses attention on the problem
of asymmetrical power and resources, which is tied to the helplessness of the
injured parties. Thus, in this telling, individual claimants lack sufficient power,
resources, and information to seek relief from the bad actor.32 Especially in
cases of small harms—so-called negative-value suits—individual plaintiffs
will be unable to pursue relief because the value of the claim is so small and
the ultimate recovery so minimal, and therefore there is scant incentive for an
28 See, e.g., Helen Perry Grimwood, Lawyers as Leaders—Part II, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Oct. 2005, at 6, 6
(describing the world of plaintiffs’ class action attorneys as a world of “sticking up for the rights of the poor
and downtrodden; of representing the rights of people who, without [the attorney’s] help, would be left without
hope”); Troy A. McKenzie, “Helpless” Groups, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3213 (2013) (describing the important
role of the helpless group in the history of modern class litigation).
29 See, e.g., John Alan Cohan, Obesity, Public Policy, and Tort Claims Against Fast-food Companies, 12
WIDENER L.J. 103, 130 (2003) (“Class actions are useful to deter corporate misconduct. . . . Companies
culpable for callous disregard of human life and health are appropriate targets of large judgments.”).
30 See, e.g., James M. Finberg, Class Actions: Useful Devices that Promote Judicial Economy and
Provide Access to Justice, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 353, 353–54 (1997) (class actions allow claimants to
aggregate claims “to fight rich and powerful corporations”); Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for
Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65, 100–01 (2003) (characterizing class actions as significant
protective mechanisms “in a world where interactions with economically and politically powerful corporations
are such a pervasive aspect of people’s daily life”); Kathleen Flynn Peterson, Standing Up for High Standards,
TRIAL, Apr. 2008, at 9, 9 (noting comment that class action practitioners need to “fight the efforts of the
powerful special interests to take away those rights that give Americans an even playing field when it comes to
holding powerful corporations accountable for misconduct that hurts people”); Sachs-Michaels, supra note 14,
at 671 (stating that the class action device “level[s] the playing field between aggrieved individuals and
powerful corporations”); Winnie Chau, Note, Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed,
Something Blue and a Silver Sixpence for Her Shoe: Dukes v. Wal-Mart & Sex Discrimination Class Actions,
12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 969, 970 n.4 (2006) (noting the trope that some view class actions as a way for
“noble crusaders . . . to pursue evil corporations” (citing Talk of the Nation: Analysis—Class Action Lawsuits
(National Public Radio broadcast July 15, 2004)). See generally sources cited supra note 26 (works of Ms.
Cabraser reflecting this same perspective).
31 See Cohan, supra note 29, at 130; Jonathan Turley, A Crisis of Faith: Tobacco and the Madisonian
Democracy, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 433, 467 (2000) (“Companies guilty of callous disregard of human life and
health are appropriately at risk of such massive [class action] judgments.”).
32 See David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class
Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1906 n.62 (2002) (noting the “dominant consensus” among
scholars and commentators that the class action device helps to “correct the obvious asymmetric litigation
power” seen in low-stakes claims).
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attorney to undertake representation.33 In addition, it is urged that corporate
defendants hold superior power and financial resources to prevail through a
battle of attrition.34 In small-claims cases, individuals simply will not pursue
relief.35 Moreover, defendants defer, deflect, or defeat case development by
impeding discovery of relevant information. In this view, the bad-actor
defendants hold all the litigation cards.36
A third feature of the class action narrative, which plaintiffs recently have
advanced, contends that, in absence of the class action mechanism, individuals
would have no effective means to vindicate their rights.37 The “effective
vindication” argument posits that the costs and burdens of conducting some
types of litigation are so great that individual claimants realistically have no
means or incentive to pursue litigation.38 Thus, the judicial resistance to
permitting aggregation of claims effectively denies individual claimants the
ability to pursue redress from more powerful defendants.39 Antitrust litigation
is one example that illustrates this effective vindication problem; plaintiffs
recently contended that, unless they could proceed as a class and share
expenses, the costs of retaining expert witnesses to prove up elements of

33 See, e.g., Jerry Enters. of Gloucester Cnty., Inc. v. Allied Beverage Grp., LLC, 178 F.R.D. 437, 445
(D.N.J. 1998) (“It must be understood that a class action plaintiff may not have very much incentive to contact
an attorney or to investigate a potential claim where the claim may be tiny. . . . The whole mechanism of the
class action recognizes this lack of incentive and the collective action problems inherent in many individuals
having potentially small claims, and encourages lawyers to prosecute these actions on behalf of plaintiffs by
holding out the promise of large fee awards.”).
34 See Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 1906–07.
35 See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913,
923–24 (1998) (defining small claim class actions as “those cases in which the claim of any individual class
member for harm done is too small to provide any rational justification to the individual for incurring the costs
of litigation”).
36 See Klonoff, supra note 14, at 756–57 (suggesting that while courts have imposed stricter evidentiary
burdens on class plaintiffs, they have at the same time permitted defendants to seek denial of class certification
without submitting to discovery).
37 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (declining to apply the effective
vindication doctrine to repudiate class action waiver provision in an arbitration agreement); cases cited supra
note 12; see also Ellen Meriwether, Class Action Waiver and the Effective Vindication Doctrine at the
Antitrust/Arbitration Crossroads, ANTITRUST, Summer 2012, at 67 (describing the effective vindication
doctrine); Linda S. Mullenix, Arbitrating Federal Antitrust Claims, Class Action Waivers, and the “Effective
Vindication” Doctrine, 40 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CASES 191 (2013) (analyzing Italian Colors); Linda S.
Mullenix, The Not-So-Effective Vindication Decision; The U.S. Supreme Court’s Ruling in Italian Colors and
Its Aftermath Are a Big Blow to the Class Action Bar, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 9, 2013, at 30 (summarizing the Italian
Colors decision and how it has been applied).
38 See Brief for Respondents at 1–2, 19–28, Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (No. 12-133), 2013 WL
267025.
39 See id. at 46–57.
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alleged antitrust violations were so prohibitive as to frustrate individual
claimants from effectively vindicating their rights.40
The fourth element of the romantic class action narrative shifts to an
appreciation of the underlying purposes of class litigation. Here, supporters
contend that class litigation achieves an efficient resolution of claims, justly
compensates injured parties, and deters defendants from further misconduct
and harmful behavior.41 The authors of the efficiency rationale typically allude
to congested court dockets, noting that judicial delays in adjudicating
individual cases effectively deny claimants their day in court.42 In this view,
aggregating claims in a class accomplishes a speedier resolution of similar
claims in one proceeding, rather than requiring thousands of like cases to
languish on court dockets.43 Regarding compensation, advocates contend that
class settlements return just compensation to class members more efficiently
and swiftly than individual litigation.44 And finally, proponents of class
litigation repeatedly argue that the mere threat of class litigation serves as a

40

Id.
See, e.g., Mary J. Davis, Toward the Proper Role for Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 OR. L. REV. 157,
169 (1998) (“The class action procedure thus evolved as a product of concern for the ‘convenient and
economical’ provision of justice, coupled with the substantive concern of affording a meaningful remedy to
large numbers of otherwise disenfranchised victims of breached obligations.” (footnote omitted)); Finberg,
supra note 30, at 353 (explaining that class actions serve goals of judicial economy and access to justice);
Klonoff, supra note 14, at 729 (noting rationales for class action device as compensation, deterrence, and
efficiency); Lahav, supra note 30, at 70 (noting two substantive justifications for class actions: compensation
and deterrence); Viivi Vanderslice, Comment, Viability of a Nationwide Fen-Phen/Redux Class Action
Lawsuit in Light of Amchem v. Windsor, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 199, 216 (1998) (noting that increased access
and economic efficiency are among the goals of the class action).
42 Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., No. B-86-456-CA, slip op. (E.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 1989), reprinted in
MULLENIX, supra note 10, at 38, 39 (certifying an asbestos class action where claims had been pending for
over three years and where claimants were ill or had died and concluding that the court “[could] see no justice
in denying the Plaintiffs their day in court in the interest of providing Defendants with a procedure for the
repetitive assertion of their defenses”). See generally Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative
Representation: Lessons for Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577 (2011)
(providing extensive analysis of the day-in-court theory as it intersects with class litigation).
43 See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 470–71 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that courts “have
been ill-equipped to handle [the] avalanche of [asbestos] litigation” and explaining that “[t]he purpose of class
actions is to conserve the resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially
affecting every class member to be litigated in an economical fashion” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Chavarria v. N.Y. Airport Serv., LLC, 875 F. Supp. 2d 164, 171 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (upholding class action
settlement and explaining that “[s]ettlements are strongly favored as a matter of policy, because ‘by lessening
docket congestion, settlements make it possible for the judicial system to operate more efficiently and more
fairly while affording plaintiffs an opportunity to obtain relief at an earlier time’” (quoting Evans v. Jeff D.,
475 U.S. 717, 761 n.15 (1986))).
44 See Cimino, reprinted in MULLENIX, supra note 10, at 39.
41
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powerful deterrent on potential corporate misbehavior, and for this reason
alone, class actions are a laudatory mechanism for accomplishing justice.45
The romantic class action narrative also turns attention to the role of
attorneys. In this portion of the narrative, plaintiffs’ class counsel arrive on the
scene as white knights (or white-hatted cowboys) who are protectors of the
downtrodden victims of corporate misfeasance and greed.46 In this telling,
class counsel undertake considerable hardships at great personal expense,
risking their own practices and livelihoods while foregoing other business in
order to achieve justice for the helpless.47 These attorneys are motivated by
idealistic sentiments to help the downtrodden, inspired by the great civil rights
cases of the 1960s and Atticus Finch, the famed defense attorney in To Kill a
Mockingbird.48 They are beknighted “private attorneys general” stepping into
45 See generally Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
2043, 2047 (2010) (proposing that “the optimal award of fees to class action lawyers in small-stakes actions is
100% of judgments” to accomplish maximal deterrent effect of class litigation); Myriam Gilles & Gary B.
Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155
U. PA. L. REV. 103, 105–07 (2006) (describing deterrence as the primary goal of class actions); Linda
Sandstrom Simard, Fees, Incentives, and Deterrence, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 10 (2011) (analyzing
the Fitzpatrick proposal to promote maximal deterrent effect of class litigation on corporate behavior). But see
David Marcus, Attorneys’ Fees and the Social Legitimacy of Class Actions, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA
157 (2011) (disputing the Fitzpatrick theory concerning maximal deterrent effect accomplished through
incentivized attorney fee awards).
46 See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Improving Class Action Efficiency by Expanded Use of Parens Patriae Suits
and Intervention, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1919, 1927 (2000) (“[Discussing the class action cultural stereotype in
which] plaintiffs’ class action lawyers were White Knights, enforcing the substantive law in order to right legal
wrongs that, without their intervention, would go unprosecuted. These White Knights not only obtained
compensation for their clients, but also were able to curb corporate abuse by deterring wrongful conduct.
These policy implications were the stuff that plaintiffs’ class counsel dream about and form the plaintiffs’
‘cultural stereotype’ of a class action.”).
47 See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1150 (2009)
(discussing the opportunity costs to plaintiffs’ attorneys in foregoing other legal work); Vaughn R. Walker,
Class Actions Along the Path of Federal Rule Making, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 445, 448 (2012) (describing class
actions as “also expensive in opportunity costs for class counsel who could devote themselves to more
productive endeavors if the social value of the relief obtained in class litigation fails to match the effort and
resources put into it”).
48 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 493 (1976). Professor Bell describes the attorney–client tension
between class clients and idealistic class attorneys during the Civil Rights Era:

This malady may afflict many idealistic lawyers who seek, through the class action device,
to bring about judicial intervention affecting large segments of the community. The class action
provides the vehicle for bringing about a major advance toward an idealistic goal. At the same
time, prosecuting and winning the big case provides strong reinforcement of the attorney’s sense
of his or her abilities and professionalism. Dr. Andrew Watson has suggested that “[c]lass
actions . . . have the capacity to provide large sources of narcissistic gratification and this may be
one of the reasons why they are such a popular form of litigation in legal aid and poverty law
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the breach of public regulatory enforcement, pursuing and vindicating justice
where governmental enforcement is feeble or lacking.
On the other hand, in this narrative, defense counsel are portrayed as
black-hatted desperadoes, willing to cynically defend awful clients in the name
of corporate greed and callous big-law practice.49 These attorneys aggressively
deploy power, money, and resources to frustrate individual claims and to
impede class litigation.50 Defense attorneys are obstructionist withholders of
information engaging in various forms of discovery abuse.51 The romantic
clinics.” The psychological motivations which influence the lawyer in taking on “a fiercer
dragon” through the class action may also underlie the tendency to direct the suit toward the
goals of the lawyer rather than the client.
Id. (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted); see also MIKE PAPANTONIO, IN SEARCH OF ATTICUS FINCH: A
MOTIVATIONAL BOOK FOR LAWYERS (1995); Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Human Rights Violations as Mass Torts:
Compensation as a Proxy for Justice in the United States Civil Litigation System, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2211,
2216 (2004) (“These Holocaust cases exemplified the most idealistic use of class action procedure, the
recognition of the federal common law incorporation of international human rights principles, and the
accessibility of United States federal courts as a forum for international claims against governmental entities
and private businesses with a United States nexus.”). According to Papantonio, a prominent plaintiffs’ class
action attorney, Atticus Finch provides a blueprint of how modern lawyers should live their lives: “[I]f we
dealt with [life’s] impediments in the same way Atticus deals with his life, many of those impediments would
disappear, and many of our problems would be more easily and satisfactorily solved.” PAPANTONIO, supra, at
34–35.
49 MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD 194–95
(1985) (describing abusive deposition tactics by defense attorneys in Dalkon Shield IUD litigation).
50 A. Darby Dickerson, The Law and Ethics of Civil Depositions, 57 MD. L. REV. 273, 365 n.426 (1998)
(“The defense counsel . . . seemed determined to instill fear in the individuals being deposed . . . . His
approach was to bait, belittle, ridicule (even to the extent of mimicking the speech pattern and accent of one of
the other plaintiffs) and threaten (‘If you lose, you may be faced with some huge legal fees incurred by the
defendant company’).” (alterations in original) (quoting M. Vanderveer, Face to Face with an Abusive
Attorney, NAT’L L.J., May 14, 1984, at 13)); Monroe Inker, Abusive Discovery Tactics in Depositions, 26
FAM. L.Q. 27, 34 (1992) (describing corporate defense counsel in class litigation as determined to “pursue[] a
line of questioning that appeared to challenge [a plaintiff’s] ancestry in an egregious fashion”).
51 See, e.g., Christine Hatfield, Comment, The Privilege Doctrines—Are They Just Another Discovery
Tool Utilized by the Tobacco Industry to Conceal Damaging Information?, 16 PACE L. REV. 525, 527–28
(1996). The potentially massive damages in these cases give large corporate defendants incentive to withhold
information:
Major corporations, like those comprising the tobacco industry, involved in complex tort or
product liability litigations have tremendous incentive to withhold information; this incentive is
directly proportional to the damages available to successful plaintiffs in those actions. Typically
in such cases, the defendant is a tobacco company with greater wealth, expertise and resources
than the plaintiffs, who are typically individuals or, at most, a class of individuals all seeking
redress for a similar wrong. The defendant in these cases also has exclusive possession of almost
all of the information necessary for the just adjudication of the claims filed against it, forcing the
plaintiff to rely on the defendant’s good-faith compliance with the discovery rules in order to
prove her claims.

MULLENIX GALLEYSPROOFS2

412

12/23/2014 12:07 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:399

narrative concludes with disparaging judgments concerning the amoral defense
attorneys who have sold out to protect and preserve the prerogatives of
corporate privilege.52
This final chapter in the romantic class action narrative reflects on the
Supreme Court’s recent class action jurisprudence regarding litigation classes53
and classwide arbitration.54 From the plaintiff’s vantage, this collection of
Supreme Court opinions evinces a deeply held contempt for and rejection of
class action litigation, demonstrating the Court’s support for corporate interests
over the protection and well-being of the little guy.55 In this regard, class action
advocates construe the Court’s recent pronouncements as denying access to
justice to the poor, uneducated, and the least capable of society’s citizens.56
Consequently, over the past twenty years, discovery abuse has become a standard defense
tactic in litigating many of the most complex tort and product liability cases. In particular, the
tobacco industry has developed several evasion strategies of choice, including, but not limited to,
delay, inundating an opponent with reams of useless information, use of the court system to wage
a war of motions and protective orders against an adverse party, as well as filing patently false
and misleading responses to discovery requests. Every strategy is designed to force the massive
expenditure of frequently scarce plaintiff’s resources in order to sort out the data provided or
fight for the enforcement of discovery orders. The net result of these strategies is obstruction of
the process of determining the truth of a matter and prevention of fair and impartial justice.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
52 See, e.g., Michael McCann & William Haltom, Review Essay, Ordinary Heroes vs. Failed Lawyers—
Public Interest Litigation in Erin Brockovich and Other Contemporary Films, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1045,
1052 (2008) (“[F]our motifs add up to a characterization of civil justice that marshals stereotypes to ridicule
‘civil justice’ as an oxymoron. [These] motifs—(1) innocent victims seek corporate accountability but are
stymied by (2) armies of amoral defense attorneys who best (3) an overmatched and socially maladroit
plaintiffs’ attorney until (4) a lay ‘outsider’ ensures the eventual plaintiffs’ victory—dramatize[] a plucky
heroine’s triumph over a biased, indifferent system of civil disputing.”).
53 See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust
Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
54 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
55 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: Toward a More Functional Rule 23, 46 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1097, 1098 (2013) (noting criticism of Dukes and Concepcion decisions as undermining
class litigation); Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 627 (2012) (suggesting the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Concepcion will place many companies outside the reach of class action litigation); Klonoff, supra note 14, at
729 (arguing that courts have significantly undermined the “compensation, deterrence, and efficiency
functions of the class action device” in recent years); Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future
Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 37 (2011) (arguing the Dukes standard
for class certification “jeopardizes potentially meritorious challenges to systemic discrimination”); David S.
Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 266–68 (2012) (claiming “the
class action for consumer and employment claims is dead” in light of the Concepcion decision).
56 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice,
90 OR. L. REV. 703, 705, 708–09 (2012) (suggesting that without the ability to bring class action lawsuits,
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B. The Darker Counternarrative
The romantic class action narrative—perpetuated by the plaintiffs’ bar,
judicial opinions, and academic adherents—has its counterpart in a darker
narrative about class litigation advanced by corporate defendants, skeptical
courts, and assorted defense-side interest groups.57 The defense-side narrative,
of course, renders a bleaker portrait of class litigation that counters all aspects
of the plaintiffs’ romantic narrative.
Thus, class action commentators have suggested that not all class members
are helpless victims in need of assistance in asserting their rights, contending
that such sweeping generalizations amount to a form of unattractive
paternalism.58 In addition, class action critics contend that in many cases class
members may not even know that they have been harmed, may not care about
minor injuries, and may be entirely disinterested in pursuing litigation.59 In this

potential plaintiffs will be prevented from bringing any claim at all due to a “lack of knowledge, lack of
resources, or fear of retaliation”).
57 See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1769,
1772–73 (2005) (describing historic judicial skepticism and hostility to class action litigation, with citation to
authorities). An alignment of interest groups and organizations frequently appear as amici curiae in major class
litigation, supporting defense positions in these cases. These repeat-player litigants include the Business
Roundtable, the Cato Institute, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the DRI – The Voice of the
Defense Bar, the International Association of Defense Counsel, the National Association of Manufacturers, the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, the Products Liability Advisory Council, the
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, and the Washington Legal Foundation. In most recent
class litigation before the Supreme Court, combinations of these interest groups have filed amici briefs on
behalf of the corporate defendants. See, e.g., Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of the
Petitioners, Comcast, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (No. 11-864), 2012 WL 3716868; Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America et al. Supporting Petitioners, Amgen Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1184
(No. 11-1085), 2012 WL 3555290; Brief of Amicus Curiae of Securities Industry & Financial Markets Ass’n
in Support of the Petitioners, Amgen Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1184 (No. 11-1085), 2012 WL 3555289.
58 See, e.g., Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 71 n.208
(2003) (noting Professor David Luban’s defense of paternalism in public interest litigation, manipulating
clients and putting interest of a cause above clients’ interests (citing DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE:
AN ETHICAL STUDY 317–40 (1988)).
59 See In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1047
(S.D. Tex. 2012) (noting that only eleven claims were filed from a class of over one hundred million people,
“[d]espite a vigorous notice campaign”); Kelly Brilleaux & Stephen G.A. Myers, Reevaluating the 401/403
Balance in Twenty-First Century Mass Torts, FOR DEF., Feb. 2014, at 48, 48–49 (describing the influential
effects of broad media advertisement on class litigation by claimants who may not have known about harms or
cared about litigation and proposing introduction of evidence of such advertising as it affects class or mass
litigation); Samuel M. Hill, Small Claimant Class Actions: Deterrence and Due Process Examined, 19 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 147, 159 (1995) (“The very small claims of the plaintiffs and class members, coupled with their
typical lack of interest or participation in the litigation, places small claimant class action outside the realistic
boundaries of the Article III ‘case or controversy’ requirement.”); Stacey M. Lantagne, A Matter of National
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version of the narrative, class counsel often are portrayed as stirring up
litigation; impermissibly soliciting clients in order to pursue the attorney’s own
class action agenda, ideological cause, or (more cynically) out-sized legal fees;
or pursuing a combination of these aims.60 In the worst version of this
narrative, particular class action litigation is the consequence of an attorney’s
own ideas and initiative, rather than that of any aggrieved individual seeking
attorney advice and classwide relief.61
Regarding the alleged problem of asymmetrical resources, defendants
contend that it is not always the case that individual litigation is impaired or
impeded because of an imbalance of financial resources or informational
access. In this regard, individuals with high-value, meritorious claims usually
are able to retain capable counsel willing to vigorously pursue relief based on
contingency fee arrangements, undercutting the need for aggregation of
claims.62 Thus, in individual litigation where there is likelihood of success on
the merits with substantial recovery, the playing field is leveled where counsel
advance costs and expenses.63
In addition, in the class action arena the advent of third-party litigation
financing has allowed, supported, and encouraged mass litigation.64 Moreover,
it is not always the case that defendants control all relevant information that
they withhold from plaintiffs; in some instances, plaintiffs either retain or have
access to sufficient relevant evidence to prove up their claims without recourse
to burdensome and expensive discovery. Finally, defendants contend that class

Importance: The Persistent Inefficiencies of Deceptive Advertising Class Actions, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 117,
134 (2013) (noting the lack of interest in making claims).
60 See supra note 59.
61 See, e.g., Brilleaux & Myers, supra note 59, at 49 (noting that in some situations, “[plaintiffs’]
attorneys conceive of the tort, advertise to the public, and find dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of clients
to pursue the claims” and that “legal advertising does not identify underserved individuals with valid legal
claims”).
62 See Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 149, 240 (2003) (noting the “prevalence of contingency fee arrangements to finance litigation
on the plaintiffs’ side”).
63 See id. at 162 (noting that persons with strong claims are most at risk from the “monopoly power
wielded by class counsel”).
64 See Thurbert Baker, Paying to Play: Inside the Ethics and Implications of Third-Party Litigation
Funding, 23 WIDENER L.J. 229 (2013); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate
Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273 (2012); Deborah R. Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation: Global Class
Actions and Third-Party Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306, 320 (2011); Geoffrey J. Lysaught &
D. Scott Hazelgrove, Economic Implications of Third-Party Litigation Financing on the U.S. Civil Justice
System, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 645, 646 (2012); Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal Versus Reality in Third-Party
Litigation Financing, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 593, 609 (2012).
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action plaintiffs wield enormous power in their ability to make excessive and
disproportionate discovery requests—sometimes conducting what amounts to
“fishing expeditions”—which negatively affect ongoing business operations,
imposing substantial costs and burdens on defendants.65
In response to the recently-urged “effective vindication” argument,
defendants counter (now supported by the Supreme Court), that denying the
use of the class action mechanism is simply not a denial of an individual’s
ability to vindicate his or her rights.66 As such, the effective vindication
argument is a rhetorical theory without jurisprudential or practical merit. This
argument proceeds from the fundamental principle that no person has a “right”
to pursue a claim as a class action; Rule 23 is a procedural rule that creates no
substantive right to its use.67 Moreover, judicial foreclosure of a class action
does not result in an individual being denied access to court or adjudication of
one’s claims; instead, it merely means that an individual must bring suit
individually and not as a collective action.68
The defense-side counternarrative to the plaintiffs’ romantic account
challenges the broad, conclusory assertions concerning the laudatory and
beneficial effects of class litigation. Thus, critics of class actions contend that
litigation or settlement classes fail to accomplish compensatory and deterrence
goals, or at least that these assertions are largely unsupported or unproven.69
With regard to deterrence, many corporate defendants view class judgments
and settlements as a cost of doing business, subsidized by insurers or passed
along to consumers.70 In addition, class litigation gives primacy to the
efficiency rationale at the expense of litigant autonomy for both plaintiffs and

65 See, e.g., Brief of the Manufactured Housing Institute et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
11–15, Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013) (No. 11-1450), 2011 WL 9372907
(describing examples and impact of abusive plaintiffs’ class action discovery techniques).
66 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309–12 (2013).
67 Id. at 2309–10.
68 Id. at 2311.
69 See, e.g., Brief for the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 11–17, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317), 2014
WL 60718 (arguing that purported class benefits of compensation and deterrence “are unsubstantiated in
theory or fact”); Brief for Amicus Curiae the Financial Services Roundtable in Support of Petitioners at 6–8,
Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (No. 12-133), 2012 WL 6759409 (“[C]lass actions may fail to compensate
class members and can be used to subject defendants to tremendous settlement pressure, regardless of the
merits of the claim.”).
70 See Tiger Joyce, Reining in Crazy Class-Action Lawsuits, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Jan. 9, 2014, 12:00
AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/367911/reining-crazy-class-action-lawsuits-tiger-joyce
(commenting on the moldy washing machine cases and cost passed along to consumers).
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defendants, with the sacrifice of fundamental constitutional rights.71 In this
view, judicial interest in efficient docket-clearing through speedy class
resolution of mass claims sacrifices defendants’ due process and jury trial
rights.72
Perhaps most important, corporate defendants that typically are the target
of class litigation repeatedly have argued that class litigation is a burden on
ongoing business operations, wasteful, and generally harmful to the overall
economy.73 In a variation of this argument, corporate defendants have long
contended that class action litigation—especially the action of a court in
granting class certification—amounts to unfair settlement blackmail.74 Thus,
corporate defendants may capitulate to meritless or unsubstantiated claims
rather than incur substantial ongoing litigation expenses with the risk of an
adverse jury decision.75
In their counternarrative, defense counsel also paint an equally dark and
caricatured portrait of plaintiffs’ class counsel, whom they clearly do not
embrace as white-hatted heroes in the litigation landscape. Instead, class
counsel are viewed as entrepreneurial bounty hunters stirring up faux class
actions in the attorneys’ own primary interests of recovering large fees.76 In
this version of the narrative, class counsel often are portrayed as conflicted
agents using poorly-informed plaintiffs as pawns for the attorneys’ own ends.
71

See MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF
CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 20 (2009) (positing that the class action “threatens core constitutional and
democratic values”); Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the
Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1617 (2007) (noting the surprising lack of
attention to the “collectivist-individual tension” that adheres in the class action framework); William B.
Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 426 (2001) (noting that primacy is
given to judicial efficiency and economy over litigant rights).
72 See Redish & Larsen, supra note 71, at 1575.
73 See Brief for the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
supra note 69, at 5–11 (arguing that “[t]he costs of securities class actions to the U.S. economy and capital
markets are unjustifiable”); Brief of Amici Curiae the Partnership for New York City, Inc. et al. in Support of
Respondent at 3, 18, Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A., v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (No.
08-1008), 2009 WL 2896303.
74 See Brief of Intel Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5–16, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-277) 2011 WL 288897 (discussing problem of settlement blackmail).
75 Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51
F.3d 1293, 1298–99 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Brief of Retail Litigation Center, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 4, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013) (No. 11-864) 2012 WL
3716867 (“The risks of trying thousands of claims in a single lawsuit often are too great for rational corporate
decisionmakers to bear. . . . [E]ven where the merits of the underlying case are weak . . . .”).
76 See REDISH, supra note 71, at 14 (characterizing class action plaintiffs’ attorneys as free-ranging
“bounty hunters”).
THE
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At worst, critics of class action litigation perceive plaintiffs’ attorneys to be
ethically-challenged and riddled with agency problems.77 And where objectors
intervene to challenge class settlements based on allegation of collusion,
self-dealing, and selling out class members, class counsel are viewed as the
source for breeding satellite litigation.78
Finally, defense counsel reject the plaintiffs’ hyperbolic rhetoric
concerning recent Supreme Court class action pronouncements, contending
that no one is being denied access to justice as a consequence of the Court’s
pronouncements. Thus, defendants construe the Court’s opinions as merely
restating longstanding, fundamental class action principles, clarifying the
application of those principles in particular factual contexts.79 In addition, the
Court’s class action jurisprudence has not uniformly favored corporate
interests; for example, the Court has consistently upheld the
fraud-on-the-market presumption in securities class litigation, which is a
plaintiff-favoring presumption.80 Moreover, the Court has not presumptively
ruled against classwide arbitration either.81 Thus, the plaintiffs’ overheated
protestations concerning the Court’s pro-corporate bias—as well as the end of
class action litigation generally—is just that: overheated, bombastic rhetoric
designed to engage sympathies of those inspired by the romantic class action
narrative.
II. RETHINKING THE ROMANCE AND OTHER DARK TALES
Fifty years of class action experience—since the 1966 amendments—has
given rise to two competing extreme narratives of the value and efficacy of
class litigation. Is there any way to evaluate and reconcile these Rashomon-like
stories to guide reasoned consideration of American class action practice?

77 See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 45, at 103–04, 112–16 (rejecting arguments based on the agency
costs of class litigation and ethical challenges to class representation).
78 See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide
Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2117–22 (2008).
79 See Ellen Meriwether, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend: Game Changing or Business as Usual?,
ANTITRUST, Summer 2013, at 57 (contending that recent Supreme Court class action jurisprudence has
portended no major change in class action practice). But see John Campbell, Unprotected Class: Five
Decisions, Five Justices, and Wholesale Change to Class Action Law, 13 WYO. L. REV. 463 (2013)
(contending major shift in class action jurisprudence).
80 Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1204 (2013); Erica P. John Fund,
Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185 (2011); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988).
81 Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013) (holding that an arbitrator did not exceed
powers in authorizing class arbitration).
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Each differing narrative contains elements of truth but, taken together, suggest
a need for rethinking the class action.
Reformers should frame this debate by asking three questions: (1) whether
the current rule effectuates the primary rationales for its existence; (2) whether
the rule as implemented breeds satellite litigation problems that undermine its
utility; and (3) whether the benefits accruing through the rule’s application
outweigh its deleterious effects. If the rule fails to fulfill its purposes and is a
litigation-breeding instrument that is not outweighed by its benefits, then there
is a need to reform the rule.
A. Evaluating the Class Action Rationales
Commentators and courts traditionally have justified the class action rule
and procedure based on three primary rationales. These include the
compensation of victims of alleged wrongdoing, deterrence of bad conduct by
defendants, and judicial efficiency and economy.82 Arguably, if the rule as
applied has failed to realize (or imperfectly realizes) these goals, then it is fair
to question the continued utility of the current rule.
1. Compensation of Victims of Wrongdoing
A primary goal of the class action rule is to enable large groups of
claimants to recover damages or to obtain injunctive relief as a consequence of
alleged wrongdoing by defendants. The Supreme Court and lower federal
courts have consistently indicated that this rationale is especially salient in
negative-value suits or small-claims consumer class actions, where individual
claimants might be discouraged or unable to pursue relief.83 Rule 23 permits
aggregation of small claims in consumer cases, and courts do certify such
cases, which typically leads to mass settlements of class claims.84
However, there is much that is not known about the actual, eventual
compensation meted out to class claimants, either in small-claims consumer
class actions or complex litigation based on other substantive theories, such as
antitrust, securities, or employment discrimination cases. Although empirical
82

See supra notes 41–67 and accompanying text.
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997).
84 See, e.g., Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp., No. 1:08-cv-10772, slip op. (D. Mass. Aug. 16, 2013) (class
settlement of Starbucks barista employee wait staff tip pool litigation); Truesdale v. Nationwide Affinity Ins.
Co. of Am., No. 1:11-cv-00467, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Apr. 4, 2013) (class settlement of insurance reinstatement
fees litigation).
83
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studies report the total aggregate amounts of settlement funds resulting from
various class litigation,85 there are no empirical studies that have drilled down
to ascertain what class claimants actually are paid individually for their claims
as a result of the class litigation. In reality, virtually all certified class actions
subsequently settle; very few certified class actions proceed to trial.86 Class
notice communicates to class members the total class fund achieved by the
settling parties; settlement notices do not typically contain information about
the payment of individual claims.
Once a court judicially approves a settlement after a fairness hearing,
commercial vendors usually handle claims processing. Studies suggest that
very small percentages of class members actually file and receive
compensation from settlement funds.87 In instances where claim rates are low,
settlement funds may revert to the defendant or be applied to a cy pres purpose,
depending on the settlement terms. Clearly, reversionary settlements or cy pres
relief do not serve the purpose of compensating the actual victims of
wrongdoing. In any case, it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain information
concerning payouts to individual class members.
Consequently, there is scant evidence upon which to conclude that class
action litigation and settlement actually accomplish the stated goal of
compensating victims of wrongdoing. Published reports of global settlement
funds fail to reveal the most crucial information that is needed to assess
whether class litigation satisfies this rationale: i.e., whether individual class
85 See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards,
7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 830–31 (2010).
86 Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649,
1650 (2008) (“Settlements dominate the landscape of class actions. The overwhelming majority of civil actions
certified to proceed on a class-wide basis and not otherwise resolved by dispositive motions result in
settlement, not trial.” (citing ROBERT H. KLONOFF, EDWARD K.M. BILICH & SUZETTE M. MALVEAUX, CLASS
ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION 415 (2d ed. 2006))). Klonoff and his coauthors observed,
“Relatively few class actions actually go to trial; most settle, either after the certification decision or as trial
approaches.” KLONOFF, BILICH & MALVEAUX, supra, at 415.
87 See, e.g., Buchet v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 684, 694–95 (D. Minn. 1994); Fred
Gramlich, Scrip Damages in Antitrust Cases, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 261, 274 (1986); Christopher R. Leslie,
The Need to Study Coupon Settlements in Class Action Litigation, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1395, 1396–97
(2005) (“Many, if not most, coupon settlements have been marked by low participation rates by class
members. In his study of antitrust class actions settled by coupon distributions to the class, Gramlich found an
average redemption rate of 26.3%. The anecdotal evidence from class action litigation as a whole paints an
even bleaker picture, with redemption rates as low as 3% or less.” (footnote omitted)). In a class settlement
with General Motors, “according to the marketing expert hired by class counsel, because of the high cost of
purchasing a vehicle, the short redemption period, and the restrictions on transfer, more than half of the class
would obtain no value at all from the settlement.” Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the
Unrepresented in Class Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 439, 474 (1996).
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members actually are compensated adequately for alleged wrongdoing. On the
contrary, evidence from claim administrators suggests that a very high
percentage of class members fail to be compensated at all.
2. Deterrence of Bad Conduct by Wrongdoers
The most often-repeated rationale justifying the class action rule is that the
rule deters defendants—in the class action arena, most typically corporate
defendants—from future bad conduct. Indeed, some scholars have urged that
deterrence is the primary purpose of the class action rule and that consequently
all class actions should be mandatory in order to maximize the impact of class
litigation.88 The class action deterrence theory is based on the simple concept
that the sheer size of a class and the defendant’s potential exposure to massive
compensatory and punitive damages induces corporate defendants to refrain
from engaging in wrongful conduct.
Similar to the compensation rationale underlying the class action rule, the
deterrence theory suffers from a lack of empirical evidence and is based on
conjectured hypotheses about corporate behavior. It is likely that, in some
cases, prudent corporate counsel guide their corporate clients’ actions in the
shadow of prospective class action litigation. However, it is equally likely that
the prospect of future class litigation serves little or no deterrent function and
that at least some (if not many) corporate clients view class litigation as a cost
of doing business, with costs passed along to consumers. We do not know, and
social scientists have not been able to empirically measure, the deterrent effect
of class litigation on prospective defendants. Thus, judicial and scholarly
arguments relating to the deterrent effect of class litigation are largely
theoretical, conclusory pronouncements.
Moreover, the deterrence rationale undergirding class litigation also
inadequately accounts for the realities of how class litigation evolves.
Defendants, typically, will aggressively challenge plaintiffs’ class certification
motions. If defendants succeed in opposing class certification, then the class
action rule served no use (other than a nuisance purpose). If, however, a court
certifies a class action, defendants usually bargain for the most financially
88

See Fitzpatrick, supra note 45, at 2047 (arguing that small claims class actions serve only the function
of deterrence); Gilles & Friedman, supra note 45, at 139 (same); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass
Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 565 (1987) (one of tort system’s
primary objectives is deterrence); David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in
Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1879–82 (2002) (tort litigation should provide
optimal deterrence).
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advantageous settlement terms (i.e., a cheap settlement), and punitive damages
are typically removed from the negotiation process. In addition, defendants
admit no liability. Consequently, the combination of these settlement factors
(cheap settlement funds, no punitive damages, no admission of liability, and
reversionary or cy pres provisions), significantly undercut the deterrence
rationale for class litigation.
Finally, the deterrence rationale for class litigation carries little weight at
the extreme margins of class litigation, where corporate defendants are happy
to buy off class counsel for the cost of attorneys’ fees in return for quick and
cheap dismissal of class claims. In sum, nuisance-value class suits that are
quickly compromised at discount rates are unlikely to serve any deterrent
function.
3. Judicial Efficiency and Economy
A third rationale in support of the class action rule posits that class action
procedures enhance judicial efficiency and economy, which is largely a
utilitarian justification for the rule.89 In this view, class litigation benefits not
only the parties to a massive dispute but also serves the interests of the federal
judiciary, which otherwise might be burdened with hundreds or thousands of
repetitive, similar claims.
Thus, it is argued, in situations where there are large numbers of claimants
with similar injuries arising from common factual or legal questions, it is
inefficient to insist that such claims be pursued on an individual basis. This is
especially compelling in the instance of small consumer claims, where
individuals might not be able effectively to vindicate their rights because of the
asymmetrical risks and expenses entailed in individual litigation.
The aggregation of claims, then, helps to relieve docket congestion that
might otherwise exist by virtue of the filing of hundreds or thousands of
repetitive claims. In addition, aggregating claims allows for economies of

89 See Abdullah v. U.S. Sec. Assocs., Inc., 731 F.3d 952, 963–64 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A principal purpose
behind Rule 23 class actions is to promote efficiency and economy of litigation.” (quoting In re Wells Fargo
Home Mortg. Overtime Pay Litig., 571 F.3d. 953, 958 (9th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jay
Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1147, 1156 (2009) (arguing that
Rule 23 embraces rule-utilitarian approach and is primarily a utilitarian device); Note, Locating Investment
Asymmetries and Optimal Deterrence in the Mass Tort Class Action, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2665, 2666 (2004)
(“[T]he most prevalent benefit is administrative efficiency, meaning relatively quick and inexpensive
resolution of similar claims.”).
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scale, leveling the playing field between litigants and lowering the cost and
expense entailed in repeated individual litigation. Finally, it is contended that
class action litigation, by aggregating claims, contributes to the speedy
resolution of disputes because multiple claims may be resolved through one
proceeding. An often recited justification in favor of class litigation, as
opposed to individual proceedings, is that “justice delayed is justice denied.”90
Thus, class litigation arguably serves the three stated goals of Rule 1: securing
the just, speedy, and efficient resolution of civil disputes.91
Similar to the other justifications for the class action rule, the problem with
the efficiency rationale is that there is scant empirical proof supporting this
rationale. For example, we simply do not know whether there is or would be
massive docket congestion in the absence of a class action rule. With regard to
small consumer claims, it is most likely that virtually no one would pursue
these claims on an individual basis, thereby flooding the courts. Arguably,
large numbers of potential small consumer claimants lack interest in the
alleged injury, supporting the theory that these cases—on a classwide basis—
“just ain’t worth it.” Moreover, it is difficult to assess whether the
compensatory awards that eventually are made to such claimants are worth the
bother. If the deterrence rationale is not compelling—meaning that corporate
bad actors are not deterred by small-claims class actions—then it is difficult to
understand the need for a class action rule to pursue small consumer claims,
which might be better handled through robust regulatory oversight, penalties,
or other similar non-adjudicative means.
With regard to more substantial claims, there also is scant evidence of
docket congestion in absence of the class action rule. In the 1980s and 1990s
federal courts were gripped by a “crisis mentality” with regard to mass tort
claims, which has failed to materialize in many instances. In fact, there has
been little evidence that courts have been overwhelmed with individual suits
that might better be pursued on a classwide basis. Persons with meritorious and
substantial damage claims are more likely to pursue individual litigation (or to
opt-out of any certified class), leaving peculiar aggregations of less valuable or
dubious claims. Furthermore, federal judges have demonstrated that the courts
90

See, e.g., Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., No. 01-C-928, 2009 WL 2225419, at *2 (E.D. Wis. July
22, 2009) (“justice delayed is justice denied” to student class members); Braud v. Trans. Servs., No. 05-1898,
2009 WL 413505, at *1 (E.D. La. Feb. 17, 2009) (“Justice delayed is justice denied; there has already been too
much delay in this case.”).
91 FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[The Rules] should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”).
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are capable of designing and implementing case management programs to
efficiently process large numbers of claims individually, as Judge Eduardo
Robreno established with the asbestos docket bequeathed to him in the wake of
the Court’s Amchem decision.92
It is true that class action proceedings can achieve economies of scale
regarding litigation resources, but the pertinent question remains: compared to
what? Thus, there is meager empirical evidence that class litigation contributes
to the speedy resolution of claims. Class proceedings are subject to multiple
opportunities for litigation posturing and delay; parties can engage in
considerable motion and discovery practice prior to class certification. It is not
uncommon for class action complaints to be amended several times over the
course of proceedings. Notoriously, many class actions drag on for years,
including class litigation that eventually settles.
Moreover, class settlement may not result in the conclusion of proceedings,
as objectors may pursue appeals from class certification orders or judicial
approval of settlements. Furthermore, appellate review may result in reversals
or remands of lower court determinations, effectively subjecting class
members to further proceedings or putting them out of court altogether after
years of contested proceedings. In the final analysis, empirical studies are
lacking to show the relative temporal efficiency of class litigation as compared
to individual suits arising from the same events, although this repeatedly is
stated as a class action truism.
B. Problems Bred by Rule 23 Class Litigation: Doctrinal Elaboration Breeds
Confusion and Inconsistent Principles
Historically, procedural rules have become ripe for reform when their
application has become so complex and arcane so as to render the rules
intrinsically unfair or—as was the case with the old common law pleading
rules—create “traps for the unwary” pleader.93 Rules should be simple and
intended to achieve justice; interpretation and application of the current class
action rule arguably does not achieve this goal. Over the span of five decades,
the text of Rule 23 has lengthened by accretion, and the class action
jurisprudence interpreting the rule has mutated into an intricate doctrinal
swamp that is often inconsistent and difficult to apply.
92 See Eduardo C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liablity [sic] Multidistrict Litigation
(MDL-875): Black Hole or New Paradigm?, 23 WIDENER L.J. 97, 117–56 (2013).
93 See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
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Class action jurisprudence has become so complex that the Wright, Miller
& Kane standard treatise on federal practice and procedure now dedicates four
entire volumes to class action practice.94 In addition, two other separate
lengthy treatises are devoted to synthesizing class action doctrine.95 As most
class action practitioners appreciate, the thousands of class action opinions and
orders have created a body of decisional law in which advocates on either side
of the docket may find support for virtually any proposition, however
conflicting. Rather than clarifying doctrine, courts have instead engendered
additional layers of confusion relating to basic principles that govern class
procedure.
The problem with the doctrinal complexity and disarray in class action
jurisprudence is that it presents litigators with multiple opportunities to
encumber class proceedings with endless motions, briefing, and appeals, with
consequent delay. In the same fashion that complicated common law pleading
inspired endless rounds of reactive pleading that frustrated litigants’ ability to
reach the merits of the dispute, so too current class action litigation frustrates
Rule 23’s purposes. In addition, under the old complicated common law
pleading rules, litigants could find themselves thrown out of court for technical
pleading mistakes.96 Similarly, doctrinal disputes present class litigants with
multiple opportunities for deflecting or postponing engagement with the merits
of the dispute, often provoking dismissal of class actions on technical
procedural errors. A few of the problems (and by no means all) enmeshed in
the application of Rule 23 are suggested below.
1. Definitional Issues
Current class action jurisprudence presents plaintiffs with arcane traps for
the unwary pleader at the very outset of class litigation and concomitantly
offers defendants several opportunities for impeding such litigation in advance
of addressing the merits. Among the many doctrinal quagmires that can
ensnare prospective plaintiffs at the pleading stage are the implicit
requirements that the plaintiff set forth an adequate class definition,97 including

94

7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE (3d ed. 2005); 7AA id.; 7B id.; 7C id. (3d ed. 2007).
95 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (10th ed. 2013);
WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS (5th ed. 2014).
96 See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
97 See 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 94, § 1760.
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whether the class members are ascertainable98 and have standing.99
Problematically, the principles governing appropriate class definition,
standing, and the ascertainability of class members are not consistent across
federal courts,100 which invites gamesmanship and satellite litigation.
In a similar vein, the jurisprudence relating to the application of the explicit
Rule 23 requirements is likewise complex, inconsistent, incoherent,
ambiguous, vague, and muddled. Hence, assuming a plaintiff capably satisfies
the implicit requirements for pleading a class, that plaintiff then carries the
burden of satisfying the threshold Rule 23(a) requirements of numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.101 In addition, a
plaintiff must plead the type of class action the plaintiff seeks the court to
certify under the Rule 23(b) categories.102
With regard to the standards governing a court’s responsibility in
evaluating the Rule 23(a) requirements, decisional law itself is likewise
unclear. Thus, though the Supreme Court has endorsed the “rigorous analysis”
standard for evaluating class certification motions,103 lower federal courts have
diverged in their understanding of what the rigorous analysis test requires.104
Consequently, class advocates in different jurisdictions may be subject to more
stringent or more lax consideration of their efforts to obtain class certification.
Moreover, the principles relating to satisfaction of the Rule 23(a)
requirements are a muddle. Indeed, the Supreme Court has confessed that the
separate Rule 23(a) requirements of commonality, typicality, and adequacy
frequency overlap,105 giving rise to the question whether there is a need for
these separate requirements. Nonetheless, over the span of five decades an
98 See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 305–06 (3d Cir. 2013); Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC,
687 F.3d 583, 592–94 (3d Cir. 2012).
99 See Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 799–800 (7th Cir. 2013); In re Whirlpool Corp.
Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 857 (6th Cir. 2013).
100 See authorities cited at 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 94; see also id. § 1761 (class
representative must be a member of the class, addressing standing issues).
101 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4); see discussion infra notes 103–06 and accompanying text.
102 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b); see discussion infra notes 109–15 and accompanying text.
103 See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432–33 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131
S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 593 n.13 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“[R]ule 23 requires ‘rigorous analysis’ to ensure that class certification is appropriate.” (citations
omitted)).
104 See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 309, 315–21 (3d Cir. 2008). But cf.
Gooch v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 672 F.3d 402, 418 n.8 (6th Cir. 2012) (declining to adopt the Third
Circuit’s requirement that class certification requirements must be shown by a preponderance of evidence).
105 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 n. 20 (1997).
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elaborate, nuanced jurisprudence has developed parsing distinctions among
these three threshold requirements, which differ minutely across federal courts
and may prove fatal to class certification.106
Finally, when plaintiffs seek certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) damage class
action, which requires the court to make a finding of predominance of common
questions,107 the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have indicated that
the predominance requirement subsumes the Rule 23(a) commonality
requirement,108 basically rendering the threshold commonality requirement
nugatory in damage class actions.
2. Class Categories
Assuming that class proponents are able to satisfy threshold implicit
definitional requirements and Rule 23(a) criteria, parties seeking class
certification must plead the type of class action they are asking the court to
certify. There are four possible class categories set forth in Rule 23(b),109 and
this typography of class categories—that may have made some sense in
1966—no longer makes sense today. Indeed, class action jurisprudence has
progressively merged the different categories, resulting in a category creep that
has significantly undermined the utility of these different class categories.
Furthermore, the jurisprudence surrounding the appropriate circumstances for
certifying the different class categories is in significant disarray.
To begin, the Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class category comparatively is rarely
pursued and certified, so as to render it a kind of vestigial appendage to the
class action rule. One rarely sees a plaintiff seeking certification of a
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class, and in the rare instances where it is pleaded, it is more
often than not because of the pleader’s confusion concerning the intended
purpose of this class category.110 In addition, courts traditionally have
indicated that Rule 23(b)(1)(A) classes were not intended to afford damage or

106 See 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 94, §§ 1763–1771 (application of Rule 23(a) criteria,
with citation to authorities).
107 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
108 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623–24; AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3D § 51:68 (2014) (noting
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) predominance requirement subsumes or supersedes the FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3)
commonality requirement).
109 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(2), (b)(3).
110 See 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 94, §§ 1772–1774 (describing nature and purposes of
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and (B) subcategories).
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monetary relief to class members.111 Nonetheless, over time—and as an
illustration of category creep—courts have permitted monetary relief to be
awarded and have certified Rule 23(b)(1)(A) classes that include damage relief
in the pleadings.112 Once courts began to certify Rule 23(b)(1)(A) damage
classes, arguably there was no longer a need for a separate and confusing
(b)(1)(A) class category.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.113 effectively
rendered the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class category largely irrelevant. That decision
restrained the use of the limited fund class action to an extremely narrow set of
historical antecedents.114 In addition, the principles governing certification of a
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited fund class action are so difficult to satisfy115 that
plaintiffs hardly ever seek certification of a (b)(1)(B) class action. Thus, in the
intervening fifteen years since the Ortiz decision, virtually no courts have
certified or approved Rule 23(b)(1)(B) classes.116
Moreover, the 2003 amendments to Rule 23 provided discretion to judges
to order that notice be given to prospective Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class
members.117 Because notice can be provided to Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class
members—a due process protection formerly reserved for Rule 23(b)(3)
damage class members only—this added provision further eroded conceptual
differences among the distinct class categories. Taken together, then, the
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B) class categories have essentially outlived their
original purposes and currently serve scant useful function in class action
practice, other than to provide opportunities for satellite litigation challenging
the improper pleading of such Rule 23(b)(1) classes.
While the Rule 23(b)(2) class action for injunctive and declaratory relief
would appear to be the simplest class category to comprehend, it nonetheless
111 Id.; see, e.g., In re First Am. Corp. ERISA Litig., 258 F.R.D. 610 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (class certification
under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) not appropriate where participants and beneficiaries of employee pension-benefit plan
primarily sought monetary damages under ERISA for alleged breach of fiduciary duties).
112 See, e.g., Harris v. Koenig, 271 F.R.D. 383, 394 (D.D.C. 2010) (class certification appropriate in suit
against ERISA plan fiduciaries seeking monetary and injunctive relief since there was “risk of inconsistent or
varying adjudication with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
113 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
114 Id. at 832–38, 842.
115 Id. at 838–42.
116 See 7AA WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 94, § 1774 (citing sparse class certification for Rule
23(b)(1)(B) proposed classes post-Ortiz and failure of proposed classes to satisfy Ortiz criteria).
117 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A).
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has become similarly enmeshed in doctrinal controversy. Although the
Supreme Court in its Dukes decision attempted to clarify the circumstances in
which damages might or might not be appropriate in a (b)(2) setting, the Court
failed to endorse any of the competing, conflicting lower court standards for
cases in which damages are sought in the (b)(2) context.118 Consequently, the
appropriateness of Rule 23(b)(2) damage classes remains an open question,
subject to varying interpretations across the federal circuits.119
Additionally, as indicated above, the 2003 amendments to Rule 23
provided discretion to judges to order that notice be given to prospective Rule
23(b)(2) class members, effectively rendering the (b)(2) similar to a (b)(3)
damage class. In some instances, judges have ordered both notice and an
opportunity to opt-out to Rule 23(b)(2) class members where the court has
certified a damage class.120 Arguably, there is no reason for a separate Rule
23(b)(2) class category that merges injunctive and compensatory relief, and
also provides for notice and an opt-out right. In such cases, there is little
difference between this type of class action and a Rule 23(b)(3) damage class
action.
As further proof of class action category creep, evolving Rule 23(b)(2)
class action jurisprudence has overlaid a “cohesion” requirement for
certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class.121 For all practical purposes, the Rule
23(b)(2) cohesion requirement mimics the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance
requirement, in that the presence of individual issues among class members
will defeat both Rule 23(b)(2) cohesion and Rule 23(b)(3) predominance.
Thus, class action doctrine effectively has converged for the Rule 23(b)(2) and
Rule 23(b)(3) class categories.
Finally, the jurisprudence applicable to the Rule 23(b)(3) damage class
action, which accounts for the major portion of current class litigation, is
riddled with conflicting doctrine relating to the rule’s predominance and
superiority requirements.122 Courts are fairly split concerning whether
118

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2257–61 (2011).
E.g., Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2003); Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l Inc., 195 F.3d 894 (7th
Cir. 1999); Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001); Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Corp.,
151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998).
120 In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 417 (5th Cir. 2004).
121 Gates v. Rohm & Hass Co., 655 F.3d 255, 269–70 (3d Cir. 2011) (proposed Rule 23(b)(2) class not
sufficiently cohesive to merit certification); In re St. Jude Med., Inc., 425 F.3d 1116, 1122 (8th Cir. 2005);
Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 143–46 (3d Cir. 1998).
122 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). See generally 7AA WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 94, §§ 1777–1779
(citing authorities and noting circuit conflicts).
119

MULLENIX GALLEYSPROOFS2

2014]

RETHINKING THE AMERICAN CLASS ACTION

12/23/2014 12:07 PM

429

predominance should be evaluated with reference to differences among class
members or reflective of a defendant’s uniform course of conduct.123
Consequently, whether a proposed Rule 23(b)(3) class will be certified or not
often depends on the particular forum in which relief is sought.124 The
complicated expressions of tests for predominance and superiority likewise
encourage forum shopping among class litigants.
3. Due Process Protections
Class action jurisprudence expresses heightened concern for the due
process protections of absent class members,125 but practical application of
Rule 23 often falls short of accomplishing this lofty rhetorical goal. If the
structural provisions of the current rule fail to accomplish this goal, then
reform to encourage better protection for class members seems laudable.
As indicated above, the 2003 amendments to Rule 23 provided discretion
to judges to order notice in the mandatory Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes.126
But the amendments did not require that such class members be provided with
an opt-out option to the extent judges decided to provide notice to a 23(b)(1) or
(b)(2) class in the first instance. Consequently, the 2003 amendments did not
adequately deal with the question of the due process protection of Rule
23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class members, a problem that has remained an open
question since the Court’s decision in Philips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.127
Moreover, judicial application of the Rule 23(a)(4) adequacy requirement,
particularly as it relates to assessing the adequacy of proposed class
representatives, often fails to ensure the due process protection of absent class
members.128 If it is the case that courts fail to seriously enforce the Rule
23(a)(4) threshold adequacy requirement, it is legitimate to question whether
Rule 23(a)(4) serves a purpose other than as mere decoration in Rule 23(a).
Similarly, the transposition of the adequacy requirement relating to counsel to
123

See In re Welding Fumes Prods. Liab. Litig., 245 F.R.D. 279, 303–08 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
Id.
125 See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–28 (1997).
126 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A).
127 472 U.S. 797 (1985); see also Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83 (1997); Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co.,
982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 510 U.S. 810 (1993), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted,
511 U.S. 117 (1994). See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Getting to Shutts, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 727 (1998)
(discussing unresolved Shutts issue).
128 See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Taking Adequacy Seriously: The Inadequate Assessment of Adequacy
in Litigation and Settlement Classes, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1687 (2004) (discussing lax consideration and
enforcement of adequacy requirements at the front- and back-end of class litigation).
124
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Rule 23(g) has negligible effect on courts’ cursory evaluation of proposed
counsel.129
In theory, the Rule 23(e) requirement that a court conduct a hearing to
assess the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of proposed settlements
ought to provide another layer of due process protection for absent class
members.130 In practice, however, the hydraulic pressure for courts to approve
settlements routinely leads courts to rubber stamp such class action settlement
agreements.131 Thus, although the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005 (CAFA) was intended to address settlement abuses,132 there is little
evidence that courts have constrained dubious settlement practices. Hence,
parties have circumvented CAFA’s intent to eliminate notorious coupon
settlements by creating surrogate remedies that mimic coupons but are not so
designated,133 and controversial cy pres and reversionary provisions continue
to be included in settlement agreements.134 Moreover, courts continue to
129 See Robert H. Klonoff, The Judiciary’s Flawed Application of Rule 23’s “Adequacy of
Representation” Requirement, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 671, 697, 699–702 (commenting on skepticism that
Rule 23(g) would address problems with ensuring adequacy of class counsel).
130 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
131 See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New in
Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1883 (2008) (noting that the House Judiciary
Committee was suspicious of state courts that would “rubber-stamp settlements that offer little or nothing to
the class members” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
132 See, e.g., Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Congress enacted CAFA in
2005 to ‘assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members with legitimate claims; [to] restore the intent of
the framers . . . by providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance under
diversity jurisdiction; and [to] benefit society by encouraging innovation and lowering consumer prices.’ As
this description of the Act’s purposes makes clear, CAFA was designed primarily to curb perceived abuses of
the class action device which, in the view of CAFA’s proponents, had often been used to litigate multi-state or
even national class actions in state courts.” (alterations in original) (citations omitted)); see also Smith v.
Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401, 404 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing how CAFA expanded federal
diversity subject matter jurisdiction to combat perceived abuses in class litigation and abusive practices by the
plaintiffs’ class counsel); Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1193 (11th Cir. 2007) (same); Mississippi
ex rel. Hood v. Entergy Miss., Inc., No. 3:08cv780 HTW–LRA, 2012 WL 3704935, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 25,
2012) (same); Proffitt v. Abbott Labs., No. 2:08-CV-151, 2008 WL 4401367, at *1–2 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 23,
2008) (same).
133 See David L. Aronoff & Saul S. Rostamian, Navigating the Minefield: Lessons of Figueroa v. Sharper
Image and Defense Counsel’s Guide to Settling Coupon-Based Class Actions After CAFA, ANDREWS CLASS
ACTION LITIG. REP. (Westlaw), Sept. 18, 2008, at *1, *2 (advising defense counsel on settlement terms to deal
with CAFA’s coupon prohibition); Donna L. Wilson, John W. McGuinness & Veronica D. Gray, Settling
Class Actions: Alternatives to Coupon Settlements After CAFA and Considerations for Corporate Defendants,
ANDREWS CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (Westlaw), Feb. 19, 2009, at *1, *1–2 (citing numerous surrogate
alternatives to coupons).
134 See, e.g., Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 861, 865–67 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting cy pres portion
of proposed class action settlement); see also Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian & Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres
Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV.
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routinely approve outsized and substantial fee awards, often over the protests
of objectors.135
Lastly, American class action jurisprudence has long resisted addressing
due process concerns through a lens of participatory democracy, instead
defaulting to the Rule 23’s preference for an opt-out procedure as a surrogate
mechanism for consent to jurisdiction.136 The European Union recently has
endorsed the opt-in principle as its model regime for collective redress
mechanisms.137 In American class litigation, then, it remains questionable
whether Rule 23, as applied, adequately protects the individual autonomy
interests of absent class members.
C. Balancing Beneficial Effects and Deleterious Consequences
The question whether Rule 23 needs radical reform should be answered by
balancing the rule’s beneficial effects against its deleterious consequences. The
class action rule allows for aggregation of common claims and empowers
individual litigants through collective action. It does contribute to economies
of scale in pursuing relief. The class action arguably is an especially powerful
tool with regard to seeking relief for small consumer claims. But, on balance,
class litigation as it is currently practiced has engendered an array of
undesirable consequences that cannot be overlooked. Many of these adverse
effects have developed because of the complex and arcane jurisprudence that
has accreted to the rule, permitting strategic gamesmanship that undermines

617, 620 (2010) (discussing the “dramatic turn in modern class actions toward the use of cy pres relief”). But
cf. In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2013) (upholding cy pres award in class
settlement); In re LivingSocial Mktg. & Sales Practice Litig., 298 F.R.D. 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2013) (same); Minor v.
FedEx Office and Print Servs., Inc., No. C09-1375 TEH, 2013 WL 503268, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2013)
(discussing problems with reversionary clauses in settlement agreements); Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.,
827 F. Supp. 2d 172, 186 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (explaining why reversionary clauses require heightened scrutiny
in settlement agreements).
135 See Robert B. Gerard & Scott A. Johnson, The Role of the Objector in Class Action Settlements—A
Case Study of the General Motors Truck “Side Saddle” Fuel Tank Litigation, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 409, 411
(1998) (discussing award of $26 million fee to class attorneys for $1000 coupon to class members with market
value of $100, over objections); Alan B. Morrison, Improving the Class Action Settlement Process: Little
Things Mean A Lot, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 428, 434–35 (2011) (noting that the Public Citizen Litigation
Group routinely objected to large attorney fee requests, which it invariably took as a sign of an unfair class
settlement).
136 See REDISH, supra note 71, at 36; Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant
Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1573 (2007).
137 See Commission Recommendation (EU) No. 396/2013 of 11 June 2013, On Common Principles for
Injunctive and Compensatory Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of
Rights Granted Under Union Law, 2013 O.J. (L 201) 60 (setting forth opt-in principle for claimant parties).
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and subverts the rule’s utility. Some of these less than desirable consequences
of the class action rule are discussed below.
1. Effectuating or Undermining the Goals of Rule 1?
As indicated above, class action procedure is lauded because it arguably
supports the goals of Rule 1 to achieve the just, speedy, and efficient resolution
of large-scale complex litigation.138 In addition, class action procedure is
lauded because, in theory, it exerts a powerful deterrent effect on potential
corporate wrongdoers.139 While there is much to admire in the theory of class
litigation, in practice, these lofty aspirations often fall short.
Securities class actions provide an interesting illustration of the sometimes
perverse effects of class litigation. In many ways, securities class litigation
presents the archetype of the much-praised small-claims action. However, the
practical pursuit of securities actions demonstrates how doctrinal exegesis has
contributed to gamesmanship and distortions in the class action arena.
Arguably, securities class actions fail to effectuate the chief goals of the class
action rule: compensation of victims, deterrence of wrongful conduct, and
efficient resolution of disputes.
Securities class actions benefit from relatively easier class certification
because of the fraud-on-the-market presumption applicable to such actions.140
Consequently, the virtually routine certification of securities class actions
exercises a strong in terrorem effect on defendants, often forcing settlement
without regard to the merits of the underlying claims.141 In securities class
actions, defendants will enter into questionable settlements even if they are
faced with a small chance of devastating losses.142 This is true for other types
of class litigation as well.143
The in terrorem effect of a certified securities class action is so powerful
that virtually no securities class action ever goes to trial. Since 1995, of the
3,988 securities class actions filed, only fourteen went to a trial verdict,

138

See supra Part II.A.3.
See supra Part II.A.2.
140 See cases cited supra note 80.
141 Brief for Petitioners at 41, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014)
(No. 13-317), 2013 WL 6907610.
142 See id.
143 See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995).
139
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representing one-third of one percent of the cases. In 2012, no securities class
action went to a trial verdict.144
The lopsided risks in the securities class arena, then, have inspired a
nuclear proliferation of such class actions. Industry observers indicate that in
any five-year period, there is a ten percent chance that any publically-held
corporation will be sued in a Rule 10(b)(5) class action.145 Ironically,
advocates of the fraud-on-the-market presumption believed that it would
curtail securities fraud class actions, but this has proven wrong.146 In the period
between 1988–1991, such lawsuits tripled.147 Moreover, since enactment of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995,148 which was intended to rein
in abusive securities class litigation, the number of securities class actions has
increased through 2012.149
Securities class litigation, arguably, has failed to effectuate the rationale to
compensate victims of wrongdoing. Evidence suggests that securities fraud
settlements poorly compensate alleged victims.150 Thus, in the period between
1996–2010, the median securities settlements returned only 2.8% of plaintiff
losses; in 2012, the percentage was even lower, at 1.8%.151 Moreover, these
compensation values represent gross returns before accounting for huge
transaction costs, such as attorney fees, litigation expenses, officers and
directors insurance, business interruption costs, as well as the adverse publicity
and stigma that attaches to such litigation.152
Moreover, securities class litigation arguably fails to deter culpable parties.
Thus, the class deterrent effect is muted because the corporation and its
144

Brief for Petitioners, supra note 141, at 41.
See id. at 40.
146 Id.; see also Cecilia A. Glass, Note, Sword or Shield? Setting Limits on SLUSA’s Ever-Growing
Reach, 63 DUKE L.J. 1337 (2014) (documenting increase in securities class actions in the wake of enactment of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998).
147 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 141, at 40.
148 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of titles 15 and 18 of the United States Code).
149 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 141, at 40–41.
150 Id. at 41–42.
151 Id. at 43.
152 Id. at 42–43 (“[T]he costs of class actions—in attorney fees and other expenses—constitutes a
deadweight loss, simply rearranging shareholders own money, minus a cut for the lawyers. And that is a prime,
juicy cut. Plaintiffs’ attorney fees amount to somewhere between 23% and 32% of aggregated settlement
amounts; defense fees, generally paid regardless of outcome, rival that amount overall.” (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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insurers, rather than the corporation’s agents, pay settlements.153 It is extremely
rare for executives or directors to personally pay for any wrongdoing; culpable
individuals pay less than one-half of one percent of settlements.154 Instead,
insurers pay approximately sixty-eight percent of settlement judgments, and
companies pay thirty-one percent.155 In the securities class action arena, then,
investors themselves wind up paying judgments.156 It has been observed that
this creates a perverse system where the innocent pay settlements and the
guilty do not, and thus constitutes an arrangement that undermines
deterrence.157
Finally, securities class litigation offers a counterexample of the efficiency
rationale undergirding class litigation. Hence, commentators have noted that
securities class actions consume excessive judicial resources, observing that
sixty to seventy percent of the cases that settle require more than three years to
resolve.158 In addition, twenty percent of securities class actions take more than
five years to resolve.159
2. Invitation to Unethical Conduct, Principal–Agency Problems, and
Champerty and Stirring Up Litigation
Briefly, another negative consequence of modern class action practice is
that attorney fee incentives are so substantial as to invite unethical professional
conduct or old-fashioned champerty. Although class action litigation has
inspired a considerable literature relating to the principal–agency problems that
adhere in class litigation,160 in actual practice there are few constraints on
153 Id. at 42 (“‘[T]he costs of securities class actions—both settlement payments and the litigation
expenses of both sides—fall largely on the defendant corporation,’ which means that ‘its shareholders
ultimately bear these costs indirectly and often inequitably.’” (alteration in original) (quoting John C. Coffee,
Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1534, 1536 (2006))).
154 Id. (“[E]xpansion of private class actions ‘leads to large judgments, payable in the last analysis by
innocent investors, for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers.’” (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 262 (1988) (White, J., dissenting)).
155 Id. at 44.
156 Id. at 42 (noting that “‘most of the plaintiff class will lose more as holders than they will gain as
buyers’” and that “settlements are even worse for smaller undiversified shareholders,” who have to share the
cost of litigation, with no benefit (quoting Richard A. Booth, Class Conflict in Securities Fraud Litigation, 14
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 701, 701 (2012))).
157 Id. at 43–44.
158 Id. at 44–45 (characterizing securities class actions as “gluttonous consumers of judicial resources”).
159 Id. at 45.
160 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of

MULLENIX GALLEYSPROOFS2

2014]

RETHINKING THE AMERICAN CLASS ACTION

12/23/2014 12:07 PM

435

unethical conduct. Because the primary checks on unethical practice are
centered in adequacy requirements, lax judicial oversight often fails to detect,
restrain, or otherwise chastise attorney misconduct at the expense of absent
class members. In addition, objectors to dubious class settlements have proven
to be relatively weak protectors of class interests, as most courts summarily
dismiss objections to settlements.161
In addition, the substantial fee incentives attached to class settlements have
contributed to the stirring up of class litigation; thus, no sooner does any
product defect or consumer issue emerge than attorneys file multiple, repetitive
class actions across the country. The pervasiveness of modern social media
outlets contributes to widespread dissemination of information about filed class
litigation, with concomitant client solicitation urging joinder in such actions. In
the romantic narrative of class litigation, this is positively characterized as the
exercise of private attorneys general vindicating the rights of injured claimants;
in the counternarrative, such conduct represents private “bounty hunters”
engaged in entrepreneurial litigation.162 Similar to problems with lax judicial
oversight of unethical attorney conduct in the class settlement arena, courts
largely ignore claims of champerty or stirring up of class litigation.163
3. Public Confidence in Judicial System
In the end, those who would consider possible reform of the American
class action rule might usefully question whether such current class action
practice instills public confidence in the judicial system. While there is much
the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995); Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation,
Amplification, and Distortion, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 475, 480–92 (describing costs and benefits of aggregate
litigation and its potential for distortions); Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
805 (1997); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051 (1996);
Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration,
and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1885–87 (2006).
161 See Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and Class Action
Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 105–06 (2007) (describing settlement objection as a “futile exercise” since
“history shows that courts consistently approve proposed settlements over the objections of class members”).
162 Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private
Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 77 (referring to class action attorneys as private
“bounty hunters”); see also supra note 76 and accompanying text.
163 See Green v. Plantation of La., LLC, No. 2:10-cv-0364, 2010 WL 5256354, at *5 (W.D. La. Nov. 24,
2010) (noting duty of court to refrain from stirring up unwarranted litigation); Geoffrey P. Miller, Payment of
Expenses in Securities Class Actions: Ethical Dilemmas, Class Counsel, and Congressional Intent, 22 REV.
LITIG. 557, 560–61 (2003); Jack B. Weinstein, The Democratization of Mass Actions in the Internet Age, 45
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 451, 467 n.62 (2012) (noting that champerty constraints on class actions have
fallen out of favor with courts).
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to admire in the concept of the class action rule, it is debatable whether actual
class action practice contributes to public confidence in the legal system. We
do not know. The answer to this question may depend on the extent to which
any person places credence and has faith in the romantic class action narrative
or instead embraces the counternarrative of the darker side of class litigation.
Class action litigation is widely reported throughout modern media outlets,
including huge class awards and attorneys’ fees.164 Consequently, it seems
likely that there is a fair measure of public awareness about this form of
litigation. It is difficult to assess, however, whether citizens perceive class
litigation as an effective vehicle for vindicating individual claims, or whether
class litigation has instead bred some degree of cynicism about the legal
profession. Moreover, there is a dearth of commentary regarding claimant
satisfaction with the results of class litigation or satisfaction about the attorneys
who engage in this practice. If it is the case that class litigation has become a
focal point for cynicism about the profession and the judicial system, then
reform to counteract the sources of this cynicism seem in order.
III. ENVISIONING A MODIFIED CLASS ACTION RULE
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules is again considering amending
Rule 23, a comprehensive project that it undertook in 1991 but abandoned by
1997.165 The Committee then amended the rule again in 2003 to add provisions
relating to the appointment of class counsel and attorneys’ fees166 and other
minor revisions.167 The Committee is once more considering amending the rule
to add a provision relating to settlement classes, an amendment that was
withdrawn in the late 1990s after considerable debate within the practicing bar
and academic community.168

164 See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Susanne Craig, Bank of America Settles Suit Over Merrill for
$2.43 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2012, at A1, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/bankof-america-to-pay-2-43-billion-to-settle-class-action-over-merrill-deal/; Class Action, supra note 17; Sharon
Terlep, NCAA Settles Class-Action Lawsuit Over Head Injuries, WALL ST. J. (July 29, 2014, 10:41 a.m. ET),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/ncaa-settles-class-action-lawsuit-over-head-injuries-1406641717.
165 See 1–4 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23 (1997).
166 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g), (h).
167 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (permitting discretionary notice to Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2)
classes); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (requiring a fairness hearing for judicial evaluation of proposed settlements).
168 See Proposed Rules, 167 F.R.D. 523, 537 (1996) (presenting a proposed addition of new Rule
23(b)(4)); Richard Marcus, Shoes That Did Not Drop, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 637, 642–44 (2013) (noting
withdrawal of the proposed Rule 23(b)(4) settlement class and massive negative reaction to the proposed rule).
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This Article instead suggests a more radical revision of the class action rule
because the rule arguably no longer serves its stated purposes, has proved
inefficient and unfair, has inspired entrepreneurial litigation, and has
engendered an arcane, complex jurisprudence that contributes to
gamesmanship and traps for the unwary. In addition, a class action practice
that is characterized by substantial attorney fee awards and slight returns to
class members may have engendered cynicism about the legal system.
In 1991, at the outset of the Advisory Committee’s review of Rule 23, the
Committee initially considered revamping the entire rule.169 That approach was
rejected after considerable resistance from the practicing bar. This Article
invites the Advisory Committee to consider a wholesale rethinking of Rule 23
in light of what we know about the actual practice of class litigation. These
proposed principles are intended to simplify the rule, return it to original
purposes, reduce doctrinal confusions, mitigate abusive practices, eliminate
gamesmanship and traps for the unwary litigator, and instill faith in the legal
system.
The following sets forth a set of guiding principles intended as a framework
for considering a radical revamping of the class action rule and practice.
Clearly, some of these concepts present challenges for codification in a rule;
some may be unsuitable for rule reform because of constitutional limitations
imposed by the Rules Enabling Act.170 Instead, those suggestions might be
more appropriate for statutory consideration.
A. “One Class Action”—Elimination of Class Categories
As suggested above,171 the current Rule 23(b) class categories are either
moribund artifacts of the 1966 amendments (the (b)(1) class categories), or
doctrinally problematic (the (b)(2) and (b)(3) categories). In addition, the
separate class categories have experienced substantial category creep or
erosion, rendering class distinctions relatively meaningless. Thus, the
introduction of discretionary notice for mandatory classes has essentially
merged all class categories, while simultaneously retaining the conundrum that
only (b)(3) class members are entitled to opt-out. In essence, the Rule 23(b)
categories represent nothing so much as mindless formalism that affords
169 See Marcus, supra note 168, at 642–44 (discussing the abandonment of wholesale revision of Rule 23
in the 1990s).
170 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2072 (2012).
171 See supra notes 109–24.
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litigants opportunities for gamesmanship, contributing to unnecessary expense
and delay.
The current requirement that proposed class actions be pleaded under one
or more of the Rule 23(b) categories brings to mind the old common law
requirement that petitioners plead their causes through appropriate forms of
action, based on appropriate writs. The complicated writ system, which served
to frustrate rather than enhance justice, was famously abandoned by eighteenth
century legal reformers. The centerpiece of the eighteenth century reforms was
to abolish all preexisting forms of action and the complicated writ system.172 In
one fell swoop the reforms ended decades of legal obfuscation, a principle that
was then embedded in the Field Code173 and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.174
The class action rule might be revised to reflect the reality that, in essence,
we have one form of class action, and it should simply be called “a class
action.” The Rule 23(b) categories should be eliminated entirely as
cumbersome artifacts of the 1966 amendment process. However rule reformers
might have intended the Rule 23(b) categories to be implemented, the separate
class categories have outlived their functional usefulness in the twenty-first
century. Instead, the class categories merely serve as formalistic impediments
to resolving aggregate litigation disputes.
Ironically, rather than embracing the concept that the class categories
essentially have merged, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules is
resuscitating the proposal to add a new class category for settlement classes.175
The proposal to add a new settlement class category was scuttled in the late
1990s176 but may gain traction in this new round of rule reform. The proposal

172

See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
See Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch. 379, § 62, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 510 (“The distinction between actions at
law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such actions and suits, heretofore existing, are abolished; and,
there shall be in this state, hereafter, but one form of action, for the enforcement or protection of private rights
and the redress of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action.”). These provisions of New York
law are commonly referred in the name of their drafter and proponent David Dudley Field. See generally
Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural
Vision, 311 LAW & HIST. REV. 311 (1988) (discussing Field’s life and reviewing the development and various
provisions of the Field Code).
174 See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (1938) (“There shall be one form of action to be known as ‘civil action.’”)
(amended 2007).
175 See sources cited supra note 168.
176 See Marcus, supra note 168.
173
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to add a settlement class provision reflects the lamentable trend to modify rules
by gradual accretion, rather than to contemplate meaningful wholesale reform.
B. Provide Solely for Injunctive Relief Actions and Eliminate Damage Class
Actions/Negative-Value Suits
Arguably—and controversially—the major driver of class action abuse
since the 1966 amendments has centered on the Rule 23(b)(3) damage class
action. The damage class action was the invention of the 1966 rulemakers;
there were virtually no damage class actions prior to the 1966 revision of the
Rule, which added the (b)(3) provision.177 With the advent of the mass tort
litigation crisis in the 1980s and 1990s, followed by the wave of consumer
class actions in the twenty-first century, damage class actions now dominate
the litigation landscape.178
The ascendancy of the damage class action has been accompanied by the
panoply of problems that bring class litigation into disrepute. The damage class
action, carrying with it the prospect of substantial fee awards, has incentivized
class litigation as big business. This, in turn, has engendered a litany of abusive
class behavior that has been the object of much of the criticism of class
litigation: entrepreneurial lawyering (Redish’s “bounty hunters”) stirring up
class litigation, strike suits of dubious merit, self-serving counsel selling out
class members (principal–agency problems), problematic settlements
green-lighted by accommodating judicial officers (inadequate due process
protections, reversionary provisions, coupon settlements, cy pres awards), and
insufficient or negligible compensation to class claimants. Perhaps the best
evidence that the damage class action has been transformed into a lucrative
business enterprise is the advent of third-party financing mechanisms to

177 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21, at 243 (2004) (“Since 1966, when Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was amended to add the damages class action under Rule 23(b)(3), class action
litigation has greatly expanded.” (footnote omitted)); Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure—Admiralty
and Maritime—Criminal Procedure with Report of the Judicial Conference, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966)
(discussing creation of Rule 23(b)(3) category).
178 Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation and Constitutional Rights, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 614–15
(2012) (“As one group of researchers concluded, ‘[t]he data tell us that the world of class actions . . . was
primarily a world of Rule 23(b)(3) damage class actions, not the world of civil rights and other social policy
reform litigation that . . . the 1966 rule drafters had in mind.” (alterations in original) (quoting DEBORAH R.
HENSLER, NICHOLAS M. PACE, BONNIE DOMBEY-MOORE, ELIZABETH GIDDENS, JENNIFER GROSS & ERIK
MOLLER, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 52–53 (2000))).
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subsidize such litigation,179 with the prospect of substantial returns to litigation
investors.
Many of the class action harms that have developed recently would be
avoided with elimination of the damage class action from the rule. This is not
far-fetched: the damage class action did not exist before 1966. Lacking the fee
incentives provided by the damage class action, much of the current
entrepreneurial class litigation that now infuses the legal landscape would
disappear. Thus, a reformed class action practice might return the class action
to its primary function in the 1960s: the injunctive relief class only. Reformers
are invited to envision a legal landscape that dispenses with the damage class
action but retains the injunctive relief class.
Advocates of the damage class action imbue it with almost religious-like
qualities, as the major vehicle for seeking redress of small consumer claims
that might otherwise go unrelieved. But if small-claims consumer actions, in
reality, serve a slight deterrent function and provide scant compensatory
redress to class members, it is fair to question the continued legitimacy of a
class action category that exists primarily to remunerate (and reward)
entrepreneurial attorneys with outsized fee awards.
The corporate behavior that gives rise to small-claim harms ought to be
dealt with through regulatory action, including penalties, fines, product recalls
or withdrawals, or criminal sanctions. The plaintiffs’ default argument against
recourse to regulatory control contends that the United States has weak
regulatory regimes. But the answer to this assertion is not to promote a class
action system with its own egregious problems but instead to advocate and
labor for more robust regulatory oversight and enforcement systems.
C. Provide Notice and Opt-In Principle
The current Rule 23 and accompanying class action jurisprudence provide
for a mishmash of notice provisions, some obligatory and some discretionary,
depending on class category.180 In addition, notwithstanding the fact that notice
may be ordered in (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes, the damage class is the only class
category that requires that class members be offered the opportunity to opt-out

179 See Baker, supra note 64, at 232, 234, 238–39; Burch, supra note 64, at 1275–78, Hensler, supra note
64, at 320–23; Lysaught & Hazelgrove, supra note 64; Shepherd supra note 64.
180 See supra notes 117, 120 and accompanying text.
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or exit the class.181 Further muddying this terrain, at least some adventuresome
judges have ordered that (b)(2) class claimants be afforded an opt-out right.182
These doctrinal inconsistencies have engendered the so-called Shutts due
process question,183 which the Supreme Court has yet to resolve.
A revised class action rule could resolve and eliminate these doctrinal
inconsistencies by requiring notice to claimants in any class action. In addition,
in order to anchor class litigation in principles of participatory democracy and
litigant autonomy, a revised class action rule would be based on the opt-in
principle, rather than the current opt-out regime.184 Class jurisprudence would
no longer have to rely on the artifice of implied consent doctrine; instead, class
members would affirm their desire to join class litigation by assenting to the
representation.185
D. Preliminary Merits Review
A great deal of time, energy, and resources currently are devoted to the
class certification process at the outset of class litigation. As indicated
above,186 class certification proceedings are governed by an elaborate
jurisprudence relating to implicit class requirements and Rule 23(a) threshold
prerequisites. The entire class certification process has become the major,
dysfunctional battlefield for protracted conflict among parties that has little to
do with seeking justice on the merits of the underlying dispute. The class
certification process, then, ought to be jettisoned in favor of a procedure that
instead ensures that plausibly meritorious claims are adjudicated on an
aggregate basis.
The implicit requirement for an adequate class definition has become a
pleading minefield for plaintiffs, while the ascertainability requirement has
inspired a peculiar game of hide-and-seek, which can now frustrate class
181

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
See In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 417 (5th Cir. 2004).
183 See supra notes 126–37 and accompanying text.
184 See REDISH, supra note 71, at 36–38, 131; Commission Recommendation (EU) No. 396/2013 of 11
June 2013, supra note 137.
185 Suggestions to amend class action procedure to revert to an opt-in principle have been repeatedly
advanced and rejected in the past. See Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120, 124–29 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding
opt-in rule not permissible as a matter of class action jurisprudence nor in court’s inherent equitable powers);
see also Edward H. Cooper, Federal Class Action Reform in the United States: Past and Future and Where
Next?, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 432, 439–40 (2002) (noting that several proposals have been made to the Advisory
Committee to consider opt-in and that none have passed).
186 See cases cited supra notes 103–04.
182
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certification at the pleading stage.187 The Rule 23(a) requirements fare no
better. The Rule 23(a) numerosity requirement has become a quaint appendage
in light of the size of most contemporary classes, accompanied by arcane
jurisprudential eddies focusing on such oddities as geographic dispersion of the
class.188 Rule 23(a)(2) commonality has been substantially written out of the
rule in (b)(3) class actions where predominance subsumes the requirement;189
in (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes, the cohesion doctrine reintroduces the
predominance principle into the commonality requirement. Moreover, courts
disagree on the quality and nature of commonality sufficient to satisfy the
requirement, opening substantial opportunities for legal contention.190
Similarly, class action jurisprudence has long struggled with the
Rule 23(a)(3) typicality requirement, often defining the concept in a circular
manner or indicating overlap with commonality and adequacy. And, as
indicated above,191 courts generally pay lip service to the Rule 23(a)(4)
adequacy requirement, rendering this prerequisite a mere decoration on the
rule. Finally, the requirement that class proponents request certification based
on one or more Rule 23(b) class categories is bedeviled by the arcane
jurisprudence that now attaches to these class categories, as indicated above.192
The entire class certification process, then, frequently resembles a complex
jousting exercise in which results depend more often than not on the forum in
which proponents seek class certification. In addition to the waste and
inefficiencies engendered by the class certification process, one’s sense of
justice ought to be offended by inconsistent certification orders that vary by
venue. Thus, similar to the suggestion that the Rule 23(b) categories be
eliminated, the Rule 23(a) standards likewise ought to be excised from the rule.
These prerequisites—constituting an incoherent and conflicting body of

187

See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Mays v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 274 F.R.D. 614, 619–20 (E.D. Tenn. 2011); Kempner v. Town
of Greenwich, 249 F.R.D. 15, 18–19 (D. Conn. 2008); Hewlett v. Premier Salons Int’l, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 211,
215–16 (D. Md. 1997).
189 See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text.
190 See ROBERT H. KLONOFF, EDWARD K.M. BILICH & SUZETTE M. MALVEAUX, CLASS ACTIONS AND
OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION 83–96 (2d ed. 2006) (comparing “‘Easy’ Commonality” to “Commonality
With Teeth” and noting that “[m]ost cases treat commonality as a mere formality, but occasionally courts
apply the requirement rigorously”). Compare Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir.
1997) (an example of “easy commonality”), with J.B. ex rel. Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 1999)
(an example of “commonality with teeth”).
191 See supra notes 128–29 and accompanying text.
192 See supra Part II.B.
188
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principles—ought to be jettisoned in favor of a meaningful threshold judicial
inquiry into the need for collective redress of grievances.
Proposed class litigation ought not to be bogged down at the outset with
intricate, arcane threshold inquiries that now require expensive precertification
discovery, including expert witness discovery and Daubert evidentiary
hearings.193 A threshold pleading of minimal commonality (not predominance)
ought to be accorded presumptive validity and be all that is needed to plead an
action.194 Furthermore, class proceedings ought to continue until validly
challenged by parties opposing the class.195 To counterbalance this easy
presumption, defendants ought to be afforded an early, preliminary opportunity
to challenge the underlying theories and merits of the proposed action.
A major problem with current class action practice is the reluctance of
courts to consider and rule on threshold dispositive motions prior to evaluating
a class certification motion, even though the Federal Judicial Center has
indicated that these motions should be addressed at an early stage in the
case.196 The legal arena would be improved by the recognition that not all
proposed class actions are meritorious and that at least some are advanced as
dubious, nuisance strike-suits.
A number of commentators, then, have suggested that courts should be
empowered to make a preliminary determination of the merits of proposed

193 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553–54 (2011); In re Hydrogen Peroxide
Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 322–23 (3d Cir. 2008).
194 See John Beisner, Karl Thompson & Allison Orr Larsen, Canadian Class Action Law: A Flawed
Model for European Class Actions, ENGAGE, June 2008, at 123, 123–25 (2008) (discussing history of
Canadian class action rules and more liberal approach to class certification, and the lax commonality standards
and lack of predominance requirement as in the United States).
195 See S. Stuart Clark, Ross McInnes, Colin Loveday, Andrew Morrison & Greg Williams, Is the Class
Action ‘Centre of Gravity’ Moving Away from the United States?, 80 DEF. COUNS. J. 420, 421–22 (2013)
(Australian class action proceeds until challenged by defense). See generally Stuart Clark & Christina Harris,
The Push to Reform Class Action Procedure in Australia: Evolution or Revolution?, 32 MELB. U. L. REV. 775,
779–82 (2008) (describing Australian class action legislation and procedures).
196 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 177, § 21.11, at 245–46; see also Davidson
v. Worldwide Asset Purchasing, LLC, 914 F. Supp. 2d 918, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (endorsing position that
dispositive motions should be decided prior to class certification). See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Dropping
the Spear: The Case for Enhanced Summary Judgment Prior to Class Certification, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1197
(2010) (discussing the need for courts to rule on precertification summary judgment motions); Linda S.
Mullenix, Standing and Other Dispositive Motions After Amchem and Ortiz: The Problem of “Logically
Antecedent” Inquiries, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 703 (arguing courts should determine precertification
dispositive motions before considering certification motions).
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class litigation at the certification stage.197 A possible revision to class action
proceedings would eliminate the current Rule 23(a) and (b) inquiries and
instead focus a court’s attention on preliminary inquiry into the merits of a
proposed class litigation, based on Rule 12(b)(6) or summary judgment-like
motions. In this fashion courts could permit merits-based contentions to be
advanced and evaluated at the outset of proposed aggregate litigation in order
to avert the inefficiencies generated by permitting non-meritorious or dubious
actions to proceed.
E. Financing, Attorney Fees, and Loser-Pay Rule
In 2003, the Advisory Committee added a Rule 23(h) provision relating to
attorneys’ fees;198 the rule does not prescribe any particular fee award
methodology, but the Advisory Committee Note suggests possible approaches
to fee awards.199 The adoption of Rule 23(h) was intended to codify existing
fee award practices, embracing both the lodestar and percentage of the benefit
fund methodologies.200 The rule provision relating to prescriptions concerning
attorney fee awards raises Rules Enabling Act problems to the extent that fee
setting implicates substantive law. Thus, any reconsideration of attorney fee
awards might appropriately be addressed by legislative action rather than rule
reform.
A good deal of criticism of current class action practice centers on the often
controversial outsized fee awards that may bear little relationship to the time
and effort expended by counsel, the nature of the underlying dispute, or the
compensatory awards to class claimants. Needless to say, class action
advocates are vocal defenders of the current system of fee awards.201
197 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE
L.J. 1251 (2002) (supporting preliminary merits inquiry); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Class Certification Based
on the Merits of the Claims, 69 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2001) (suggesting preliminary merits review during class
certification); Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the Merits on
Class Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324 (2011) (same). But cf. Michael J. Kaufman & John M.
Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial Creation of Class Certification Merits Trials in Securities Fraud Actions,
43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323 (2010) (arguing against judicial creation of merits review standards at class
certification for securities cases).
198 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h).
199 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) advisory committee’s note (2003) (“The rule does not attempt to resolve the
question whether the lodestar or percentage approach should be viewed as preferable.”).
200 Id.
201 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 45; Patricia M. Hynes, Plaintiffs’ Class Action Attorneys Earn What
They Get, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 243, 243–44 (1999); Andrew D. Thibedeau, Vindicating the
Public Interest?: The Public Law Implications of Attorneys’ Fee Restrictions in Class Actions, 13 SUFFOLK J.
TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 231 (2008).
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Nonetheless, attorney fee awards remain a lightning rod for cynicism about
class litigation and are the object of substantial disapproval abroad.202 In
addition, as suggested above,203 the prospect of sizeable attorney fee awards
undoubtedly is the major driver of the exponential growth of Rule 23(b)(3)
damage class actions in the twenty-first century, inspiring not only
entrepreneurial litigation but also third-party financing schemes.
Reform of the attorney fee system and litigation financing would serve to
filter out exploitative, non-meritorious class litigation. At the extreme of
developing practices, third-party financing ought to be barred because it
incentivizes class litigation by nonparty actors who are prompted by a profit
motive—and not necessarily the best interests of class members. In addition,
third-party financing has introduced challenging ethical issues into class
litigation, not the least of which is nonparty control over litigation.204
Instead, based on various models abroad, it might be beneficial to publicly
finance class litigation.205 This is especially compelling if class litigation were
returned to its injunctive roots: that is, institutional reform litigation for public
purposes. There are different approaches to public finance models, which
include screening committees that assess applications and determine whether
to apply public funds towards subsidizing class litigation.
Revenue to finance class litigation might be generated by a minimal
income tax check-off, similar to the current financing of election campaigns. In
this manner, public-spirited individuals concerned about access to justice
through class action litigation could support this conviction, while those
opposing class litigation could decline. Furthermore, class action attorneys’
fees might be based on legislatively determined fee schedules, to enable
counsel to know in advance the reasonable range of fee awards for successful
202 See, e.g., Roald Nashi, Note, Italy’s Class Action Experiment, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 147, 152, 160
(2010) (noting European resistance to American contingency fee arrangements for class action financing);
Tiana Leia Russell, Exporting Class Actions to the European Union, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 141, 150, 153, 179
(2010) (noting European criticism of American class action procedure with meager returns to class members
but large fee awards to class counsel).
203 See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
204 See Baker, supra note 64; James M. Fischer, Litigation Financing: A Real or Phantom Menace to
Lawyer Professional Responsibility?, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 191 (2014) (exploring ethical issues raised by
third-party financing); Joshua G. Richey, Comment, Tilted Scales of Justice? The Consequences of
Third-Party Financing of American Litigation, 63 EMORY L.J. 489 (2013) (exploring the ethical problems
raised by third-party financing with proposals for reform).
205 See Janet Walker, Who’s Afraid of U.S.-Style Class Actions?, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 509, 537–46 (2012)
(describing various public financing mechanisms in Canada, the U.K., and European Union countries).
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prosecution of a class action. Finally, a legislatively-enacted loser-pay rule
would serve to advance the adjudication of meritorious aggregate grievances,
while tempering enthusiasm for marginal class action strike-suits.
F. Appointment of Class Counsel
Rule 23(g), added in 2003, sets forth standards for judicial appointment of
class counsel.206 Similar to Rule 23(h), the class counsel provision was
intended to codify existing principles relating to appointment of class counsel
and adequacy of class counsel. In large-scale, complex cases, this has
sometimes led to judicial review of multiple petitions for appointment as class
counsel.207
In the twenty-first century, class action litigation has become a highly
specialized practice, pursued by both experienced counsel as well as
less-experienced novices lured by the siren song of class litigation. In the class
action arena, both clients and the judicial system are best served when
committed, experienced class litigators with sufficient resources pursue such
advocacy.
To this end, it might be useful to create a national roster of veteran class
litigators who are pre-qualified as class action specialists proficient to serve in
the capacity of class counsel. Many states now certify attorneys in specialized
practice areas;208 class litigation might be considerably improved by
prescreening mechanisms that assist courts and litigants with certified,
competent counsel to vigorously represent the interests of class members.
G. Settlement and Fairness Hearings
Rule 23(e) provides for the current practice of a fairness hearing when
parties have reached a negotiated settlement.209 This is a good provision, and
there seems little compelling need to create a new, separate settlement class
provision to further complicate the existing rule. If the class action rule were
206

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g).
See Martin v. Blessing, 134 S. Ct. 402, 403 (2013) (Alito, J., respecting the denial of the petition for a
writ of certiorari) (commenting on a district judge’s practice in appointing counsel under Rule 23(g) to ensure
diversity of representation).
208 See, e.g., Attorney Specialization Program, OHIO STATE BAR ASS’N, https://www.ohiobar.org/
ForLawyers/Certification/Attorney/Pages/StaticPage-57.aspx (last visited Dec. 14, 2014); Connect with a
Board Certified Texas Attorney, TEX. BOARD LEGAL SPECIALIZATION, http://www.tbls.org/Default.aspx (last
visited Dec. 14, 2014); Legal Specialization, ST. BAR CAL., http://ls.calbar.ca.gov/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).
209 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
207
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revised to eliminate the Rule 23(a) and (b) requirements, then back-end
scrutiny of class certification standards would be obviated. There would be no
need to create a settlement class category subject to different standards than
litigation classes.
Instead, class action practice would be improved by more robust judicial
scrutiny of settlement agreements, rather than pro forma, rubber-stamping
reviews that simply endorse proffers by the settling parties. Institutionalizing a
role for professional objectors or independent class guardians might assist in
the process of objectively evaluating the fairness, adequacy, and
reasonableness of proposed settlements. Obviously, the need for more
meaningful judicial scrutiny of class settlements cannot be mandated by rule or
statute but must be generated by legal culture.
Moreover, current objections to class action settlements often center on
inadequate compensation to class members, inadequate representation,
reversionary and cy pres provisions, and dubious coupon-like remedies (among
other criticisms). Many, if not most, of these points of contention are generated
as a consequence of the settlement of damage class actions, but these problems
would disappear if damage class actions were no longer permitted under the
rule.
CONCLUSION
Consideration of class action litigation has largely degenerated into a
partisan, ideological debate, with neither side listening to the other. Advocates
for class action litigation, on the one hand, persist in a romantic narrative,
refusing to give credence to suggestions of class action abuse. In addition,
class action proponents resist any change to class action practice or
jurisprudence that, in their view, would deny access to justice. Critics of class
action litigation, on the other hand, refuse to acknowledge the need for or
benefits of some class litigation, instead broadly viewing class litigation as an
unfair economic drag on the country’s welfare. Critics, then, applaud reform
efforts that would constrain class litigation. Thus, the debate over class
litigation reform often is reduced to hyperbolic, rhetorical posturing.
The class action rule has been amended several times, and the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules has returned to a reconsideration of Rule 23. The
Advisory Committee largely fashions rule reform through incremental
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accretion to the existing rules; boldness is not the signature quality of the
Committee.210 Therefore, consistent with past practice, it is likely that the
Committee will propose marginal changes to Rule 23 that will in turn inspire
new doctrinal confusion, gamesmanship, and conflicting interpretation. And,
inevitably, any proposed changes to Rule 23 are likely to encounter heated
partisan resistance from both sides of the litigating docket.
What the Advisory Committee will not do is to consider any radical reform
of the class action rule or practice. It might be useful, however, to recognize
that class action practice under Rule 23 has become considerably
dysfunctional; therefore, radical rethinking might be in order. The rulemakers
recognized that the original Rule 23 had been rendered dysfunctional by the
early 1960s; perhaps it is time to acknowledge this is true for the 1966
amended rule.
The class action rule is not a bad thing; it is just not working, or it is
working poorly. The premise underlying this Article is that there is scant
evidence that class action litigation as practiced accomplishes the stated goals
of compensation, deterrence, and efficiency. In addition, many of the alleged
class action abuses that are the subject of criticism arise from the damage class
action, a type of class action essentially invented in 1966. Moreover, the
current Rule 23 functions poorly because the web of accumulated class action
jurisprudence serves as an inefficient impediment to the achievement of
meaningful collective redress. Thus, to this end, the class action rule ought to
be revisited to return it to a simplified form, to better serve the ends of justice.
As indicated above, class action litigation has now become a lucrative
business with numerous stakeholders in the current system, including litigants,
courts, commercial notice vendors, and third-party financiers. Consequently,
there is much in this set of proposals to raise the ire of every actor involved in
class litigation. For example, plaintiffs’ attorneys will recoil at the prospect of
the demise of the damage class action; corporate defendants will welcome this
suggestion. Corporate defendants will recoil at the prospect of presumptive
class proceedings based on easy commonality; plaintiffs will embrace such a
proposal as advancing the interests of justice. Plaintiffs will object to any
preliminary assessment of the merits of a proposed class action; defendants
will view this as a sensible mechanism for screening dubious strike-suits.
210 See generally Richard D. Freer, The Continuing Gloom About Federal Judicial Rulemaking, 107 NW.
U. L. REV. 447 (2013) (noting trend of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to avoid clashes but instead focus
on minor issues of wordsmithing).
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Defendants will appreciate constraints on third-party financing and fee awards
as rational modifications to a system of perverse litigation-inducing incentives;
plaintiffs will abhor such constraints as violations of freedom of contract and
denials of access to justice. Both sides of the docket and the judiciary are likely
to rebel at the thought of an opt-in principle replacing the current opt-out
regime.
There can be no illusion that the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules would
even consider any of these proposals; moreover, virtually all such proposals
would be dead on arrival were they to be proposed for notice and comment.
The proposals suggested here, then, are destined to be relegated to that densely
populated realm of impractical ivory tower professorial musings. In the final
analysis, powerful forces inevitably will converge to frustrate meaningful
reform of class action practice: namely, stakeholders who have too much
invested in the current system—however dysfunctional—to desire change, and
an Advisory Committee that is timid, conservative, and constrained by political
forces.
It is, then, nothing short of a wonder that the rule reformers in the early
1960s were able to create an entirely new class action rule. At best, this Article
invites consideration and debate concerning what the litigation universe would
look like under a different collective redress regime.

